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Abstract 
In response to the euro area crisis, European policymakers took a gradual, incremental approach 
to official lending, at first relying on the approach followed by the International Monetary Fund, 
then developing their own crisis resolution framework. We review this development, marked by a 
substantial divergence in the terms of official loans offered to the crisis countries by the IMF and 
the euro area official lenders. Based on a unique dataset, we use event analysis to assess the 
impact of changing maturity and spreads of official loans on bond yields, liquidity and market 
access. In light of the euro area experience, we discuss arguments for rebalancing Debt 
Sustainability Analysis and programme design towards cash-flow management. While the official 
assistance granted to crisis countries in the euro area may not be replicable elsewhere, key 
lessons from it that could foster a reconsideration of the modalities by which official lending 
institutions handle crises. 
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I. Introduction
Until	23	April	2010,	the	date	on	which	Greece	requested	official	support	from	the	International	
Monetary	Fund	(IMF),	no	euro	area	country	had	asked	for	financial	assistance	from	the	IMF	in	
four	 decades	 (see	 Reinhart	 and	 Trebesch	 (2016)	 for	 a	 historical	 perspective	 on	 the	 IMF	
activities).	During	that	considerable	time	span,	the	IMF	signed	hundreds	of	programmes	with	
distressed	emerging	countries.	Its	relationship	with	euro	area	countries,	however,	evolved	in	a	
rather	different	direction.	The	IMF	kept	providing	regular	monitoring	and	supervision	through	
Article	 IV	consultations	and	Financial	Stability	Assessment	Programmes.	Yet,	because	of	their	
significant	quota	and	influence,	euro	area	countries’	views	had	a	remarkable	influence	on	the	
IMF’s	 policy	 decisions	 and	 institutional	 development.1	 This	 comfortable	 situation,	
characterized	by	a	 smooth	exchange	of	 cash	 flows,	 knowledge,	 soft	 supervision	and	political	
influence,	 ended	 when	 it	 became	 apparent	 that	 even	 euro	 area	 countries	 needed	 external	
support	to	recover	from	their	acute	crises,	and	for	a	variety	of	reasons	this	was	to	be	provided	
by	the	IMF.	
At	 the	 outburst	 of	 the	 crisis,	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 IMF	 in	 the	 Greek	 rescue	 programme	
helped	 overcome	 political	 hurdles,	 which	 were	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 institutional	
development	in	the	euro	area	(see	e.g.,	Jost	and	Seitz,	2012).	Indeed,	a	specific	motivation	for	
IMF	 involvement	was	that	 it	had	the	expertise	(and	financial	resources)	needed	to	overcome	
the	lack	of	an	adequate	infrastructure	at	the	euro	area	level	(Pisani-Ferry	et	al.,	2013).	The	first	
official	assistance	programme,	in	favour	of	Greece	in	May	2010,	consisted	of	an	IMF	loan	and	a	
series	of	bilateral	government	 loans,	rather	than	a	 joint	European	loan.	 In	spite	that	 in	many	
dimensions	 the	 crisis	 countries	 in	 the	 euro	 area	 were	 quite	 different	 from	 the	 typical	 IMF	
programme	 country,	 the	 programme	 framework	 was	 initially	 designed	 according	 to	 IMF	
standards---with	 the	 notable	 exception	 that,	 given	 that	 the	 ECB	 is	 not	 supposed	 to	 bend	 its	
conduct	 to	 the	 need	 of	 individual	 countries,	 the	 programmes’	 focus	 had	 to	 shift	 away	 from	
exchange	rates	and	monetary	policy,	and	place	 fiscal	gaps	and	structural	 reforms	at	 its	core.	
The	required	adjustment	was	to	be	agreed	upon	and	monitored	by	the	International	Monetary	
Fund,	the	European	Commission	and	the	European	Central	Bank.	2			
As	 it	 soon	 became	 apparent	 that	 this	 first	 policy	 reaction	 failed	 to	 bring	 the	 desired	
turnaround,	 euro	 area	 authorities	 began	 to	 devise	 incremental	 responses,	 and	 reached	
consensus	 on	 creating	 new	 institutions	 --	 first	 on	 a	 temporary	 basis	 (the	 European	 Financial	
Stability	 Facility	 and	 the	 European	 Financial	 Stability	 Mechanism),	 then	 moving	 towards	 a	
permanent	 framework	 for	 crisis	 resolution,	 built	 around	 the	 European	 Stability	 Mechanism	
(ESM).	With	the	crisis	deepening	at	a	fast	pace,	 in	recognition	of	the	specific	 issues	raised	by	
the	 high	 degree	 of	 financial	 and	 real	 interconnectedness	 among	 members	 of	 a	 monetary	
union,	the	terms	of	the	European	official	support	were	adjusted,	and	the	euro	area	approach	
to	crisis	resolution	gradually	deviated	from	IMF	standards.	
The	 most	 striking	 illustration	 of	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 euro	 area	 approach	 evolved	
throughout	 the	 crisis	 is	 the	 divergence	 in	 lending	 terms	 between	 the	 IMF	 and	 the	 different	
1	That	the	IMF´s	Managing	Director	traditionally	comes	from	the	euro	area	gives	an	idea	of	the	area’s	political	
leverage	at	the	Fund	(Jost	and	Seitz,	2012).	
2	Appendix	A	describes	the	mechanics	of	the	interaction	between	the	various	institutions	involved	in	programme	
design	and	monitoring.	
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assistance	 vehicles	 that	 the	 European	 authorities	 and	 policymakers	 created	 to	 intervene	 in	
Cyprus,	Spain,	Portugal,	 Ireland	and	Greece.	Table	1	provides	a	synthesis.	The	table	presents	
financing	 terms	per	 creditor	 and	 for	 programme	 country,	 at	 selected	dates.	 The	progressive	
divergence	in	loan	maturities	and	lending	rates	is	apparent.	
This	process	of	differentiation	did	not	come	without	tensions.	To	start	with,	in	order	to	be	able	
to	participate	 in	 the	euro	area	 rescues,	 the	 IMF	had	 to	modify	 its	 Exceptional	Access	Policy,	
used	 to	 deal	 with	 capital	 account	 crises,	 by	 introducing	 a	 so-called	 “systemic	 exemption”	
clause	(IMF,	2013a),	revoked	in	2016.	At	the	outset	of	the	crisis,	this	clause	allowed	the	IMF	to	
lend	 above	 normal	 limits,	 even	 if	 a	 country	 failed	 the	 sustainability	 tests	 (i.e.	 Debt	
Sustainability	Assessment,	DSA),	provided	a	default	could	have	systemic	effects.	Moreover,	in	
various	 crucial	 episodes,	 methodological	 and	 institutional	 differences	 between	 the	 IMF	 and	
euro	 area	 institutions	 translated	 into	 open	 disagreement.	 Although	 open	 disagreement	was	
eventually	 ironed	 out	 and	 did	 prevent	 action,	 it	was	 often	 clear	 that	 officials	 from	different	
institutions	 had	 very	 different	 positions	 on	 whether	 the	 ailing	 countries	 were	 meeting	 the	
conditionality,	and	could	have	access	to	additional	funds.3		
Table	1.	Interest	Rates	and	Maturities	by	Creditor	Type.	Selected	dates4	
	
This	paper	pursues	 two	 tasks.	First,	 it	 reviews	 the	evolution	of,	and	 the	debate	 surrounding,	
official	 lending	during	the	euro	area	crisis.	With	the	goal	of	drawing	lessons	for	the	design	of	
sovereign	 bailouts,	 we	 focus	 our	 discussion	 on	 benefits	 and	 issues	 associated	 to	 extending	
maturities	and	size	of	official	loans	beyond	the	standard	practice	of	the	IMF.	In	this	discussion,	
our	point	of	departure	 is	 the	notion	 that	 the	 terms	of	official	 lending	 (volumes,	 spreads	and	
maturities	of	official	 loans),	debt	sustainability	and	market	access	are	endogenously	linked	to	
each	other---a	point	that	we	explore	in	related	theoretical	work	(Corsetti	et	al	2017).	The	flow	
of	 interest	 payments	 and	 the	 time-profile	 of	 refinancing	 needs	 can	 be	 managed	 to	 reduce	
rollover	risk,	thereby	facilitating	market	re-access,	and	provide	crisis	countries	with	“breathing	
																																								 																				
3	The	most	controversial	aspects	related	to	the	risk	of	financial	spillovers,	most	notably	regarding	Greece’s	debt	
restructuring	and	the	bail-in	of	Irish	bank	bond	holders,	both	supported	by	the	IMF	(Pisani-Ferry	et	al.,	2013),	as	well	
as	the	design	of	the	Cypriot	programme.	
4	This	and	the	following	tables	have	been	elaborated	in	the	preparation	for	this	paper	and	the	companion	paper	
Corsetti	et	al	2017,	with	the	help	of	the	ESM	staff---whom	we	gratefully	acknowledged.	Table	1	also	appears	in	the	
background	note	for	the	ESFS/ESM	Evaluation	Report	2017.	
Maturity Interest	rate Maturity Interest	rate 5-year 10-year
May-10 5	years 4.041 3	years 3.23 8.31* 7.71
June-2011 10	years 3.78 3	years 3.53 15.97 22.93
March-2012 20	years 2.07 8	years 3.13 74.13 20.55
December-2012 30	years 0.93 8	years 3.07 n.a. 11.67
December-2010 7.5	years 5.25 7	years 3.37 n.a. 9.04
July-2011 15	years 2.74 7	years 3.53 11.35 10.62
June-2013 22	years 2.32 7	years 3.07 3.07 4.07
May-2011 7.5	years 5.47 7	years 3.37 11.06 9.38
July-2011 15	years 3.15 7	years 3.53 14.63 10.56
June-2013 22	years 2.19 7	years 3.07 5.17 6.38
Spain Nov-12 12.5	years 0.78 - - 4.17 5.3
Cyprus May-13 15	years 1.03 4	years 3.07 n.a. n.a
Sources:	International	Monetary	Fund,	European	Commission,	European	Financial	Stability	Facility,	European	
Stability	Mechanism	and	Bloomberg.	*	Refers	to	4	years	maturity
EFSF/ESM	Support IMF	Support Market	yields
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
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space”	 for	 implementing	 reforms	 and	 macroeconomic	 correction	 policies.	 In	 this	 important	
dimension,	because	of	the	significant	deviation	 in	the	official	 lending	terms	 in	the	euro	area,	
away	from	traditional	IMF	standards,	the	recent	euro	experience	provides	novel	and	valuable	
evidence.	Given	the	short	track	records	of	these	programmes,	these	results	need	to	be	treated	
with	due	caution.5	
Second,	we	build	a	detailed	dataset	that	collects	information	on	the	various	components	of	the	
official	support	received	by	euro	area	countries.	Using	this	detailed	dataset,	we	perform	a	set	
of	event	analyses	of	the	effects	of	the	terms	of	official	lending	in	sovereign	bond	markets.	The	
various	 changes	 to	 the	 financial	 terms	 of	 the	 official	 loans	 experienced	 in	 the	 euro	 area	
provide	us	with	a	unique	opportunity	for	carrying	out	such	an	analysis.	Specifically,	focusing	on	
changes	 to	 the	maturities	 and	 interest	 rates	 of	 the	 programmes	 that	 were	 implemented	 in	
mid-2011,	 we	 show	 that	 (following	 loan	 modifications)	 yields	 dropped,	 previously	 inverted	
yield	 curves	 flattened,	 and	 market	 liquidity	 improved	 (as	 indicated	 by	 narrowing	 bid	 ask	
spreads).	 We	 document	 that	 these	 effects	 were	 stronger	 for	 the	 range	 of	 maturities	
corresponding	to	years	when	the	country’s	 refinancing	needs	 fell	 the	most	as	a	 result	of	 the	
maturity	extensions	and	interest	rate	reductions	on	the	official	loans.		Our	dataset	on	Official	
Loans	 to	 Euro	 Area	 Countries	 is	 described	 in	 detail	 in	 this	 text,	 and	 is	 made	 available	 for	
researchers	to	use.	
We	 review	 the	 European	 experience	 in	 relation	 to	 key	 challenges	 shaping	 the	 debate	 on	
reforming	official	emergency	lending.	A	first	challenge	is	Debt	Sustainability	Analysis.	There	is	
an	emerging	consensus	on	the	need	to	recognize	the	importance	of	monitoring	and	managing	
debt	repayment	cash	flows	(see,	for	instance,	IMF	2013b).6	As	noted	by	Schumaker	and	Weder	
di	Mauro	2016	or	Zettelmeyer	et	al.	2017,	as	 long	as	 traditional	 frameworks	 fail	 to	 take	 into	
account	 the	 role	of	payment	 cash	 flows	 for	 sustainability	and	market	access,	DSA	cannot	be	
but	incomplete.	Specifically,	sustainability	assessments	need	to	rebalance	attention	away	from	
a	model	mostly	centered	on	debt	stock	dynamics,	and	develop	approaches	that	recognize	the	
complex,	endogenous	 links	between	public	and	private	repayment	cash-flows,	policy	reforms	
and	market	access.			
A	related	challenge	concerns	the	extent	to	which	 integrating	the	existing	approach	to	official	
support	with	cash	flow	management	can	enhance	programme	effectiveness	in	addressing	roll-
over	(liquidity)	risk	and	fundamental	(solvency/credit)	risk	(see	Dias	et	al.	2014,	Consiglio	and	
Zenios	2015	or	Gabriele	et	al.	2017).	Key	issues	are	seniority	and	moral	hazard.	While	we	focus	
mostly	 on	 the	 first	 issue,	 we	 note	 here	 that	 there	 are	 important	 trade-offs	 in	 increasing	
program	 flexibility	 over	 cash	 flows	 and	 repayment	 horizons.	 A	 common	 concern	 is	 that	 this	
may	 exacerbate	 moral	 hazard,	 as	 long-horizon	 programme	 of	 official	 lending	 may	 lead	
authorities’	to	opportunistically	postpone	adjustment	policies,	and	dilute	their	implementation	
in	the	short	run.	The	opposing	view	emphasizes	circumstances	when	the	benefits	from	costly	
reforms	and	policies	are	back-loaded.	In	this	case,	loan	terms	that	spread	repayments	over	the	
adjustment	path	can	have	the	positive	effect,	and	create	the	conditions	for	stronger	‘country	
ownership’	of	the	programme.	This	observation	applies	with	special	force	when	crisis	countries	
																																								 																				
5	See	the	ESFS/ESM	Financial	Assistance	Evaluation	Report	(2017)	
6	A	non-exhaustive	list	of	institutions	using	DSA	frameworks	includes	the	IMF,	the	World	Bank,	the	European	
Commission,	the	ECB	and	the	European	Stability	Mechanism.		
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face	very	significant	imbalances	(as	is	the	case	in	the	euro	area),	requiring	a	protracted	period	
of	deep	cyclical	and	structural	adjustment.	7	
A	third	challenge	concerns	the	scope,	model	and	goals	of	official	lending.	The	euro	area	crisis	
involved	 economies	 with	 highly	 integrated	 real	 and	 financial	 markets,	 where	 the	 spillovers	
from	a	crisis	country	can	have	systemic	consequences,	especially	in	the	region.	Regional	official	
lenders	may	have	strong	incentives	to	internalize	these	effects,	stronger	than	for	international	
institutions	 like	 the	 IMF.	 The	 collaboration	 between	 euro	 area	 institutions	 and	 the	 IMF	
provides	 an	 interesting	 case	 study	 for	 rethinking	 cooperation	 among	 official	 lenders	 in	 such	
cases	(see	Henning	2017	or	Ardagna	and	Caselli	2014).		
At	 an	 early	 stage	 of	 the	 crisis,	 fearing	 significant	 contagion	 and	 negative	 spillover	 effects	
throughout	 the	euro	area,	European	and	 international	 institutions	agreed	on	granting	access	
to	 official	 resources	 also	 to	 countries	 that	 would	 not	 pass	 the	 IMF’s	 Debt	 Sustainability	
Analysis.	The	early	 solution,	 to	 introduce	a	 ‘systemic	exemption’,	 soon	became	the	 target	of	
harsh	criticisms	within	the	IMF	on	several	grounds.	A	first	criticism	was	that	the	clause	reduced	
the	scope	for	bailing-in	private	creditors	(IMF,	2013c),	hence	increasing	the	risk	for	tax	payers	
(IMF	 2014).	 A	 second	 criticism	 was	 that,	 as	 the	 IMF	 would	 become	 exposed	 over	 longer	
periods	to	heavily	indebted	sovereigns,	its	status	as	a	lender	of	last	resort	for	sovereigns	would	
be	 in	danger	 (Reinhart	and	Trebesch,	2016).	 In	2016,	when	 the	exemption	was	 revoked,	 the	
new	 rule	 stipulated	 that,	when	 sustainability	 is	 not	 certain,	 the	 IMF	 could	 lend	only	 if	 other	
official	 creditors	 commit	 to	 cover	 any	 potential	 financial	 gap	 that	 could	 lead	 the	 country	 to	
default.		
A	closely	related	issue	is	at	the	core	of	current	debates	at	the	IMF	and	other	regional	financing	
institutions.	 There	 is	 a	 need	 to	 design	 adequate	 mechanisms	 to	 coordinate	 supranational	
(global	and	regional)	financing	institutions’	activities	as	members	of	the	global	financial	safety	
net.8	 	 If	 the	 insights	 from	the	euro	area	crisis	have	any	bite,	multilateral	and	regional	official	
lenders	could	do	well	by	rebalancing	their	models	of	cooperation,	and	working	out	an	efficient	
way	 to	 coordinate	 the	 repayment	 cash-flow	 structures	 resulting	 from	 their	 loans,	 while	
considering	the	degree	of	seniority	that	multilateral	and	regional	lenders	may	have.9		
The	 remainder	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 Section	 II	 details	 the	 institutional	
developments	 leading	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 permanent	 crisis	 resolution	 institution,	 with	 a	
specific	 lending	 toolkit,	 within	 the	 euro	 area.	 It	 also	 discusses	 how	 such	 process	 led	 to	 a	
																																								 																				
7	Conceptually	and	analytically,	official	lending	has	very	different	implications	when	directed	to	address	rollover	risk	
(due	to	self-fulfilling	expectations	causing	illiquidity)	as	opposed	to	fundamental	risk	(due	to	solvency	problems).	
The	literature	has	long	clarified	that,	acting	as	market	coordination	devices,	official	lending	in	liquidity	crisis	may	
actually	strengthen	the	incentives	for	a	government	to	undertake	costly	actions	and	improve	economic	resilience	
(see	Morris	and	Shin	2006,	Corsetti	et	al.	2005,	Corsetti	and	Dedola	2011).	This	is	because,	without	liquidity	
assistance,	the	possibility	of	belief-driven	crises	tends	to	reduce	the	expected	future	benefits	from	these	actions.	
However,	to	the	extent	that	financial	assistance	does	not	necessarily	eliminate	fundamental	default,	official	support	
end	up	foreshadowing	contingent	transfers	occurring	with	positive	probability.	This	raises	the	risk	of	moral	hazard	
discussed	in	the	text,	and	defines	relevant	policy	tradeoffs	between	addressing	social	and	economic	costs	of	
liquidity	(belief-driven)	crises,	and	mitigating	the	adverse	incentives	of	bailouts	through	conditionality	and	
programme	design.		
8	See	Cheng	(2016)	for	a	detailed	analysis	of	recent	G-20	initiatives	regarding	the	International	Financial	
Architecture,	or	G-20	(2016)	for	a	summary	of	views	as	regards	coordination	within	the	global	financial	safety	net.	
9	Tirole	(2015)	studies	whether	international	cooperation	can	improve	efficiency	over	bilateral	solidarity,	which	it	
can	if	complemented	with	rules	constraining	borrowing.	
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significant	departure	from	the	approach	traditionally	followed	by	the	IMF	to	crisis	resolution.		
Section	 III	 contrasts	 the	 approach	 by	 the	 IMF	 and	 the	 European	 institutions,	 looking	 into	
economic	 and	 institutional	 factors	 shaping	 their	 behaviour,	 and	 reviews	 some	 evidence.	
Section	IV	analyses	a	set	of	open	issues	in	theory	and	policy,	including	sustainability,	seniority,	
market	 access,	 private	 sector	 involvement	 (debt	 restructuring),	 and	 welfare	motivation	 and	
objectives	 of	 bailout.	 This	 section	 also	 conducts	 a	 preliminary	 analysis	 of	 the	 effects	 of	
programme	changes	in	2011	and	2013	on	the	yield	curve,	bid-ask	spreads	and	market	access.	
An	extensive	appendix	gives	further	details	on	the	programmes,	some	discussion	of	theory	and	
a	description	of	the	dataset.		
	
II.	The	development	of	a	euro	area	crisis	resolution	framework	
In	the	years	preceding	the	global	crisis,	most	policymakers	and	academics	failed	to	appreciate	
the	 vulnerability	 of	 euro	 area	 countries	 to	 volatile	 movements	 in	 capital	 flows	 and	 cross-
border	 investment.10	 Policymakers	 and	 international	 institutions	 failed	 to	 see	 that	 euro	area	
countries	 could	be	exposed	 to	 the	 same	kind	of	boom	and	bust	 cycles	associated	with	 large	
outswings	 in	cross-border	capital	 flows	that	had	affected	emerging	economies	after	 financial	
liberalization.	On	the	contrary,	 the	rapid	growth	 in	domestic	private	debt,	 the	accompanying	
housing	booms,	and	the	accumulation	of	very	large	imbalances	in	the	internal	current	account	
across	member	 states	were	 sometimes	 interpreted	as	 indicators	of	 successful	economic	and	
financial	 integration.11	 Indeed,	 these	 facts	 were	 periodically	 reviewed	 by	 the	 euro	 area	
institutions	as	well	as	by	the	 IMF,	however	without	 triggering	any	specific	 initiative	aimed	at	
containing	vulnerabilities	(see	Schadler	2014).		
A	key	issue	blurring	risk	assessment	was	that,	within	a	monetary	union,	the	classical	problem	
in	 a	 balance	 of	 payment	 crisis---the	 availability	 of	 international	 reserves	 ---	 is	 not	 a	 policy	
concern.	 In	 the	euro	area,	 financing	gaps	arising	 from	net	capital	outflows	and	 trade	deficits	
are	automatically	balanced	by	the	European	System	of	Central	Banks,	which	steps	in	to	insure	
the	 smooth	 working	 of	 real	 and	 financial	 transactions	 within	 the	 union	 (via	 the	 Target2	
system).	However,	as	became	clear	at	the	onset	of	the	crisis,	the	fact	that	euro	area	countries	
do	not	face	a	balance-of-payment	constraint	(no	scarcity	of	means	of	cross-border	payments)	
does	 not	 rule	 out	 vulnerability	 to	 “sudden	 stops”	 in	market	 financing,	 i.e.,	 massive	 cross-
border	withdrawals	of	private	capital.	Whether	or	not	accompanied	by	a	loss	of	reserves	and	
destabilizing	exchange	rate	depreciation,	sudden	stops	typically	give	rise	to	high	and	variable	
spreads	across	borders	and	cause	domestic	financial	fragility.	The	end-result	is	the	emergence	
of	country	 risk	affecting	all	 residents,	 including	public	 institutions,	 financial	and	non-financial	
firms	 as	 well	 as	 households.12	 This	 is	 precisely	 what	 occurred	 in	 the	 euro	 area,	 causing	
retrenchment	and	deep	segmentation	of	financial	systems	across	borders.	
The	crisis	specific	to	the	euro	began	at	the	end	of	2009,	when	the	true	magnitude	of	the	Greek	
public	 imbalances	 became	 public	 and	 the	 G20	 reversed	 its	 early	 support	 for	 fiscal	 stimulus,	
stressing	 the	 urgency	 for	 significant	 fiscal	 consolidation.	 As,	 in	 a	 few	 months,	 market	
																																								 																				
10	See	European	Commission	(1990).	
11	For	example,	the	2007	Article	IV	consultation	for	the	euro	area	stated	on	its	executive	summary	that	the	euro	
area	outlook	was	the	best	in	years.	
12	We	dedicate	further	thoughts	to	the	interaction	between	official	lenders	and	central	banks	later	in	the	text.	
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confidence	plummeted,	 the	euro	area	 institutional	 framework	offered	no	policy	 instruments,	
specific	procedures	or	designated	bodies	to	deal	with	the	looming	crisis.	Indeed,	the	euro	area	
economic	 governance	 was	 built	 around	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 Stability	 and	 Growth	 Pact,	
together	with	the	prohibition	of	monetary	financing	by	the	European	Central	Bank,	would	be	
sufficient	 to	make	 the	 ‘no	bail-out’	 clause	 a	binding	 constraint.	 The	need	 to	 reform	became	
apparent	 as	 the	Greek	 crisis	 raised	 strong	 concerns	with	 systemic	 financial	 stability,	 and	 the	
crisis	spread	across	countries	with	formally	“virtuous”	fiscal	positions	(low	debt	and	deficits),	
that	nonetheless	had	been	building	a	large	stock	of	private	debt	financing	housing	bubbles.	
One	implication	was	that,	in	the	build-up	of	the	crisis,	euro	area	authorities	faced	the	problem	
of	 implementing	 a	 timely	 and	 effective	 joint	 response	 to	 the	 shocks	 undermining	 stability,	
while	agreeing	on	key	institutional	reforms	shaping	the	future	of	the	union.	Strong	differences	
in	opinions	over	 the	modalities	of	 the	adjustment	 and	diverging	national	 interests	 (between	
creditor	countries	and	countries	mainly	exposed	to	the	negative	spill	overs	from	a	Greek	crisis)	
weighed	on	the	pace	and	intensity	of	the	reaction.		
As	the	true	depth	of	the	crisis	became	clearer	over	time,	the	approach	to	official	lending	by	the	
euro	area	authorities	evolved	significantly.	New	lending	vehicles	and	institutions	were	created,	
and	lending	terms	were	adjusted	repeatedly.		
	
II.1	The	first	response	in	an	institutional	void	
When	 the	 Greek	 Government	 first	 approached	 its	 euro	 area	 partners	 explaining	 its	 difficult	
fiscal	and	financial	conditions,	there	was	no	formal	or	informal	blueprint	at	the	euro	area	level	
that	governments	could	rely	upon	to	shape	a	common	strategy.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	crisis,	
the	 IMF	 and	 the	 EU	 did	 cooperate	 in	 funding	 financial	 assistance	 programmes	 to	 Eastern	
European	 countries	 (Hungary,	 Latvia	 and	 Romania)	 through	 the	 Medium-Term	 Financial	
assistance	(MTFA)	or	the	so-called	EU	Balance-of-Payments	Facility	(EU	BoP).	But	the	context	
in	 Eastern	 Europe	was	 quite	 different	 and	 the	MTFA/EU	 BoP	 Facility	 were	 not	 available	 for	
euro	area	countries.13		The	immediate	reaction	was	to	request	Greece	to	carry	out	a	significant	
fiscal	 adjustment---a	 solution	 that	 failed	 to	 prevent	 further	 strong	 deterioration	 of	 market	
confidence.	The	situation	soon	spun	out	of	control.	
In	March	2010,	euro	area	governments	agreed	to	have	the	IMF	on	board	and	provide	Greece	
with	 a	 financial	 assistance	 programme	 consisting	 of	 IMF	 credit,	 via	 a	 Stand-By-Agreement	
(SBA),	and	bilateral	 loans	by	other	euro	area	members,	via	the	Greek	Loan	Facility	(GLF).	The	
programme	totalled	110	billion	EUR.	The	disbursement	of	the	bilateral	loans	would	be	decided	
by	unanimity	and	subject	 to	conditionality,	assessed	by	 the	EC,	 the	ECB,	and	the	 IMF---often	
referred	to	as	the	‘Troika’	—in	collaboration	with	the	Greek	authorities.	The	first	mission	was	
in	 Athens	 in	 April	 2010.	 Initially,	 the	GLF	 contributed	 80	 EUR	billion	 (out	 of	 110),	 under	 the	
following	financial	conditions.	The	maturity	of	the	loan	was	5	years,	with	a	3-year	grace	period.	
Following	IMF	practice,	the	pricing	of	the	loan	was	set	to	be	increasing	over	the	horizon	of	the	
programme.	For	the	first	3	years,	the	interest	rate	was	set	at	a	300bps	surcharge	over	the	6-
																																								 																				
13	Not	only	the	Article	143	of	the	Treaty	excluded	euro	area	countries	from	accessing	this	facility,	in	addition,	Article	
125	prevented	cross-country	fiscal	financing	(no-	bail-out	clause).	
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month	 Euribor,	 that	 is,	 100	 bps	 above	 the	 standard	 IMF	 practice.14	 For	 credit	 outstanding	
beyond	three	years,	the	costs	were	to	increase	by	further	100	bps.	As	noted	by	Jost	and	Seitz	
(2012)	 and	 Pisani-Ferry	 et	 al.	 (2013),	 these	 relatively	 high	 surcharges	 (although	 still	 below	
market	 rates)	 were	 demanded	 by	 some	 euro	 area	 governments,	 concerned	 with	 the	
consequences	 of	 official	 support	 on	 the	 willingness	 of	 Greek	 authorities	 to	 implement	
adjustment.	In	turn,	the	IMF	contributed	30	EUR	billion	via	a	Stand-by-Agreement	with	3-year	
duration	and	a	5-year	maturity.		
Arguably,	 it	could	have	been	technically	and	financially	possible	to	expedite	the	creation	of	a	
euro	area	official	lending	framework	and	agree	on	common	principles	to	implement	structured	
interventions.15	However,	divergent	positions	on	the	rescue	strategy	immediately	surfaced.	As	
emphasized	 by	 many	 observers	 (see,	 again,	 Jost	 and	 Seitz	 2012),	 a	 number	 of	 European	
policymakers	 shared	 a	 profound	 scepticism	on	 the	 capacity	 of	 euro	 area	 institutions	 to	 deal	
with	 any	 acute	 crisis	 without	 bending	 to	 political	 pressures.	 A	 few	 euro	 area	 governments	
preferred	 to	 operate	 through	 bilateral	 engagement	 (via	 government	 to	 government	 loans),	
rather	 than	 official	 multilateral	 programmes.	 Others	 expressed	 a	 strong	 preference	 for	
involving	the	IMF,	on	the	ground	that	the	EU	lacked	the	required	expertise	(Pisani-Ferry	et	al.,	
2013).		
For	the	IMF,	however,	taking	part	in	the	euro	area	rescue	operations	raised	a	key	institutional	
issue.	 The	 large	 amount	 of	 resources	 requested	 by	 Greece	 could	 only	 be	 granted	 using	 the	
Exceptional	 Access	 Policy	 (EAP).	 But	 at	 the	 time,	 access	 to	 EAP	 was	 conditional	 on	 a	 Debt	
Sustainability	Assessment	(DSA)	showing	that	the	country’s	public	debt	be	sustainable	with	a	
high	 probability.	 For	 Greece,	 this	 was	 clearly	 not	 the	 case	 (see	 IMF	 2014).	 As	 reported	 by	
Schadler	 (2013),	 strong	 political	 pressures	 on	 the	 institution,	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 urgency	 to	 act	
swiftly	 in	 view	 of	 the	 perceived	 threat	 of	 a	 systemic	melt	 down,	 led	 the	 IMF	 to	modify	 the	
conditions	 for	 accessing	 the	 EAP.16	 An	 exception	was	 introduced,	 giving	 access	 to	 the	 Fund	
resources	to	countries	whose	debt	could	not	be	considered	“sustainable	with	high	likelihood’’,	
provided	 their	 default	 was	 deemed	 to	 have	 systemic	 implications.	 Afterwards,	 the	 systemic	
exemption	was	also	invoked	in	the	Irish	and	Portuguese	programmes.		
	
II.2	The	build-up	of	a	euro	area	infrastructure	for	managing	crises	
The	signing	of	the	Greek	Loan	Facility	on	the	3rd	of	May	2010	did	not	calm	market	turmoil,	and	
Ireland	and	Portugal	came	under	increasing	financial	pressures.	Faced	with	the	need	to	provide	
additional	 financial	support,	European	governments	started	to	move	away	from	an	approach	
resting	 exclusively	 on	 bilateral	 agreements	 and	 took	 steps	 towards	 the	 creation	 of	 jointly	
managed	institutions.	A	key	decision	was	taken	already	in	May	2010,	when	the	Ecofin	Council	
created	 the	 European	 Financial	 Stabilisation	 Mechanism	 (EFSM)	 along	 with	 the	 European	
Financial	 Stability	 Facility	 (EFSF).	 The	 creation	 of	 these	 institutions	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 a	
fundamental	change	in	the	way	programmes	were	funded,	from	direct	bilateral	loans	to	public	
																																								 																				
14	The	loan	maturity	was	5	years,	with	a	surcharge	of	200	bps	points	for	credit	above	3	times	a	country	quota.	
15	In	tackling	the	Greek	crisis,	in	particular,	the	small	size	of	this	economy	was	no	challenge	to	the	ample	resources	
available	at	EA	level.	
16	This	IMF	policy	change	is	intimately	linked	to	one	of	the	biggest	sources	of	disagreement	among	official	lenders,	
concerning	the	desirability	and	the	extent	of	a	restructuring	exercise	for	Greece	mounting	public	debt	(IMF,	2013a).	
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guarantees	 on	market	 financing.17	 Beyond	 this,	 the	 template	 of	 the	 EFSM/EFSF	 programme	
remained	the	same	as	that	applied	earlier	in	Greece.		
The	EFSM	became	operational	on	the	10th	of	May	of	2010,	with	the	stated	aim	of	preserving	
financial	 stability	 by	 providing	 financial	 assistance	 to	 member	 states	 of	 the	 euro	 area	 in	
economic	difficulties.	 Its	design	was	that	of	an	emergency	funding	programme,	administered	
by	 the	 Commission,	 reliant	 upon	 funds	 raised	 on	 the	 financial	 markets	 using	 the	 European	
Union’s	budget	as	collateral.	The	EFSM	had	the	authority	to	borrow	up	to	60	billion	euro.18	In	
turn,	the	EFSF	was	created	as	a	temporary	rescue	mechanism,	operating	under	Luxemburgish	
private	law,	with	the	mandate	to	safeguard	financial	stability	by	providing	financial	assistance	
to	euro	area	members	within	the	framework	of	a	macro-economic	adjustment	programme.	To	
fulfill	its	mission,	the	EFSF	finances	its	loans	by	issuing	debt	in	capital	markets. In	order	to	build	
a	significant	firewall,	euro	area	governments	provided	the	EFSF	with	guarantees	to	support	up	
to	440	billion	of	lending	at	low	rates.19	
In	late	2010,	Ireland	became	the	first	country	to	access	support	from	the	two	new	institutions.	
The	country	was	overburdened	because	of	the	combined	effects	of	the	real	estate	crisis	(at	the	
end	of	 its	housing	bubble)	and	the	 fiscal	consequences	of	 the	bail	out	of	 its	banking	system.	
The	 Irish	programme,	 signed	 in	December	2010,	 consisted	of	 a	 financing	package	of	 EUR	85	
billion,	to	be	disbursed	over	three	years.	20	It	included	contributions	by	the	EFSM	(22.5	billion)	
and	 the	 EFSF	 (17.7	 billion),	 supplemented	by	 bilateral	 loans	 from	UK,	 Sweden	 and	Denmark	
(3.8,	0.6	and	0.4	billion,	respectively).21	The	maturity	of	EFSF/EFSM	loans	was	set	at	7.5	years	
and	the	spread	at	294	bps	(over	the	funding	cost).	In	addition,	Ireland	signed	a	7-year	Extended	
Fund	Facility	(EFF)	agreement	with	the	IMF	for	22.5	billion.		
A	few	months	later,	in	April	2011,	it	was	the	turn	of	Portugal	to	request	support.	In	this	case,	
the	 programme	 financed	 78	 billion	 euro,	 falling	 in	 equal	 parts	 on	 the	 European	 Financial	
Stabilisation	 Mechanism,	 European	 Financial	 Stability	 Facility	 and	 International	 Monetary	
Fund.	There	was	an	important	change	in	the	terms	of	the	EFSF	and	EFSM	official	loans.	While	
the	maturity	of	 the	 loan	was	 the	same	as	 in	 the	 Irish	programme,	7.5	years,	 the	spread	was	
lower,	210	bps.	In	addition,	Portugal	signed	a	7-year	EFF	programme	with	the	IMF.		
Under	 the	 pressure	 of	 a	 steadily	 deteriorating	 financial	 outlook,	 in	 June	 2011	 euro	 area	
authorities	 concluded	 the	 negotiations	 on	 setting-up	 a	 permanent	 crisis-fighting	 institution,	
the	European	Stability	Mechanism	 (ESM),	 to	become	operational	by	2014.22	 In	 July	2011,	 an	
agreement	was	 reached	on	making	 the	scope	of	 the	ESM	 interventions	as	comprehensive	as	
																																								 																				
17	The	lending	costs	included	those	related	to	the	need	to	create	cash	collateral	(a	“cash	buffer”).	
18	This	arrangement	has	no	cost	for	the	EU,	as	interests	and	principal	are	repaid	by	the	beneficiary	State.	
19	Overcollateralization	 (165%)	 underpins	 the	 EFSF	 high	 credit	 rating,	 allowing	 it	 to	 borrow	 at	 rates	 close	 to	 the	
German	bund.	In	October	2011,	after	Ireland	and	Portugal	had	to	step	out	as	guarantors,	guarantees	were	increased	
to	keep	the	lending	capacity	at	440	billion	without	the	need	of	a	“cash	buffer”		
20	The	programme	did	not	allow	the	Irish	government	to	combine	financial	support	for	its	banks	with	some	form	of	
creditor	bail-in,	as	initially	proposed	by	the	authorities.	
21	The	programme	also	included	an	Irish	contribution	of	17.5	billion	euro.	
22	According	to	the	ESM	framework,	decisions	on	programmes	(such	as	disbursement	decisions)	are	taken	by	ESM	
governing	 bodies	 (as	 opposed	 to	 the	 Eurogroup	 under	 the	 EFSF)	 based	 on	 a	 proposal	 by	 the	 ESM’s	 Managing	
Director.	Within	the	framework,	when	assessing	the	economic	situation	of	the	requesting	country	and	when	signing	
the	MoU,	the	EC	acts,	in	liaison	with	the	ECB,	as	an	agent	of	the	ESM.	Programme	negotiation,	a	task	of	the	EC,	shall	
involve,		whenever	possible,	the	IMF.	
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possible.	 The	 ESM	 was	 set	 to	 provide	 loans	 for	 the	 indirect	 recapitalization	 of	 financial	
institutions,	 and	 to	 intervene	 directly	 in	 the	 sovereign	 bond	 markets,	 both	 primary	 and	
secondary,	and	(later	on)	 in	extreme	cases,	 to	provide	direct	bank	recapitalization	via	capital	
participation.	 The	 bank	 recapitalization	 facility,	 created	 to	 provide	 assistance	 for	 the	
management	 of	 banking	 crises,	 requires	 a	 specific	 form	 of	 conditionality,	 focused	 on	 the	
financial	 sector.	 The	 bank	 recapitalisation	 facilities	 created	 the	 premise	 for	 official	 support	
programmes	without	the	IMF’s	financial	participation.23	
In	parallel,	in	spite	of	the	optimism	of	the	first	programme	review,	emphasizing	“an	impressive	
start”,	 the	 situation	 in	Greece	 took	a	 turn	 for	 the	worst.24	The	 first	 response	was	 to	provide	
additional	support,	lowering	the	interest	on	the	loans	and	increasing	maturities	(June	2011).	By	
early	2012,	however,	it	became	increasingly	clear	that	Greece	would	not	be	able	to	match	its	
financial	commitments,	without	a	contribution	from	its	private-sector	creditor	base.	In	March	
2012	Greece	signed	a	second	programme.25	The	new	programme,	signed	with	the	EFSF	and	the	
IMF,	 envisioned	 additional	 funding	 for	 130	 billion	 euro,	 which	 were	 to	 be	 added	 to	 34.5	
undisbursed	funds	from	the	GLF.	From	the	130	billion	euro,	25	came	from	a	new	IMF	7-year	
EFF	programme.	The	rest	(104	billion)	was	provided	by	the	EFSF,	with	a	20	year	maturity	and	
150	 bps	 spread.	 Simultaneously,	 the	 GLF	 borrowing	 costs	 and	 maturities	 were	 modified	 to	
match	the	EFSF	conditions.	The	terms	of	the	various	loans	were	further	softened	by	December.	
A	similar	development	characterized	the	Portuguese	and	Irish	programmes.	According	to	their	
reviews,	both	programmes	remained	broadly	on	track,	but	,	over	time,	their	performance	fell	
short	of	expectations.	As	discussed	by	Pisani-Ferry	et	al.	(2013),	the	key	problem	in	Ireland	was	
the	effect	of	the	bailout	of	the	banks’	junior	creditors	on	the	country’s	public	debt;	in	Portugal,	
the	 problem	 was	 that	 the	 structural	 reforms	 on	 which	 the	 programme	 relied	 did	 not	
materialize.26	 In	July	2011,	both	countries	were	granted	significant	reductions	on	the	interest	
and	extension	in	the	maturities	of	the	loans.	As	detailed	in	the	next	section,	further	maturity	
extensions	were	granted	in	late	2013.	
Under	the	pressure	of	the	crisis	spreading	through	Italy	and	Spain,	an	agreement	was	reached	
on	 inaugurating	 the	 ESM	 at	 an	 earlier	 date	 than	 initially	 scheduled.	 The	 ESM	 entered	 into	
action	in	October	2012,	with	500	billion	lending	capacity	supported	by	700	billion	in	capital.27	
From	an	institutional	perspective,	the	creation	of	the	European	Stability	Mechanism	endowed	
Europe	 with	 the	 missing	 permanent	 facility.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 the	 ESM	 has	 provided	
assistance	to	Spain	(July	2012),	Cyprus	(June	2013)	and	Greece	(September	2015).28		
																																								 																				
23	To	achieve	this	new	policy	regime,	Member	States	changed	the	Lisbon	Treaty	to	strengthen	coordination	and	
improve	the	surveillance	of	budgetary	discipline	(Pisani-Ferry	et	al.,	2013).	
24	The	reasons	for	the	set-back	were:	excessively	optimistic	economic	projections,	initial	official	indecision,	weak	
programme	implementation	and	excessive	stringency	of	initial	funding	conditions	(Pisani-Ferry	et	al,	2013).	
25	The	new	MoU	forced	a	debt	restructuring	and	recognised	the	failure	of	the	previous	to	improve	competitiveness.	
26	The	IMF’s	DSA	showed	that	Portugal	needed	structural	reforms.	In	retrospect,	the	programme’s	original	design	
lacked	full	appreciation	of	the	difficulty	of	implementing	them	within	a	Monetary	Union	(Pisani-Ferry	et	al.	2013),	
where	exchange	rate	accommodation	is	off	the	table.	
27	Capital	increased	with	Latvia	and	Lithuania	becoming	members	of	the	euro	area.	
28	As	of	June	2017,	the	IMF	has	made	no	contribution	to	the	third	programme	for	Greece	(nor	did	it	finance	the	
Spanish	program).	
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In	Cyprus	the	template	of	the	 intervention	replicated	that	of	previous	programmes,	although	
the	 weight	 of	 euro	 area	 official	 financing	 increased	 markedly.	 The	 ESM	 contributed	 with	 9	
billion	 euro,	 while	 the	 IMF	 contribution	 was	 limited	 to	 1	 billion	 euro.	 The	 ESM	 assistance	
programme	 of	 9	 billion	 euros	 was	 agreed	 in	March	 2013.	 Eventually,	 however,	 the	 country	
only	requested	disbursements	for	6.3	billion	euros	in	loans.		In	Spain,	Greece	and	Cyprus,	the	
ESM	programmes	featured	relatively	long	maturities.	In	the	case	of	Spain	the	average	maturity	
of	 the	 loan	 was	 12	 years,	 with	 the	 final	 payments	 in	 2025.	 For	 Cyprus	 this	 was	 15	 years,	
extending	up	to	2031.	Similar	to	the	ESM	loan	to	Cyprus,	the	terms	of	the	Greek	2015	loan	are	
very	accommodative.	The	spread	is	set	at	10	bps	over	the	ESM’s	funding	costs,	with	a	32	year	
maturity.	
Yet,	with	the	evolution	of	the	lending	framework,	the	Spanish	programme	already	followed	a	
markedly	different	template.29	Spain	was	granted	up	to	100	billion	euros	of	financial	assistance	
for	bank	recapitalisation.	This	was	subject	to	narrow	conditionality	focused	on	financial	sector	
reform.30	 	 Because	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 programme,	 the	 euro	 area	 authorities	 proceeded	
without	the	financial	involvement	of	the	IMF,	and	Spain	became	the	first	euro	area	country	to	
be	supported	exclusively	by	the	new	institution.		
	
II.3	The	evolution	of	the	terms	of	official	support	
Official	 support	 programmes	 in	 the	 euro	 area	 have	 been	 subject	 to	 various	 renegotiations,	
much	more	 so	 than	 IMF	 programmes,	 which	 only	 featured	 a	move	 from	 an	 SBA	 to	 an	 EFF	
programme	 in	 Greece.	 This	 section	 describes	 the	 financial	 side	 of	 those	 renegotiations.	 In	
Table	2	we	show	the	most	salient	programme	changes	resulting	from	them.31	
The	context	of	 the	euro	area	crisis,	especially	the	 lack	of	historical	experience	to	draw	upon,	
made	it	extremely	difficult	to	assess	the	right	course	of	action	at	each	point	 in	time.	A	major	
source	 of	 uncertainty	 was	 the	 depth	 of	 euro	 area	 interdependence,	 determining	 the	
vulnerability	 of	member	 states	 to	 cross-border	 spillovers.32	Authorities	had	 little	 guidance	 in	
gauging	 the	extent	 to	which	 specific	 policy	 actions	 in	 a	 region	 could	 affect	 the	 financial	 and	
macroeconomic	systems	of	other	regions.	In	fact,	the	IMF’s	systemic	exemption	suggests	that,	
at	an	early	stage	of	the	crisis,	contagion	concerns	strongly	conditioned	policy	choices.	A	further	
complicating	factor	was	the	fact	that,	obviously,	euro	area	countries	could	not	adjust	exchange	
rates:	conditionality	had	to	focus	on	structural	and	fiscal	policy.33	Faced	with	these	challenges	
and	operating	under	serious	time	constraints,	European	policymakers	ended	up	responding	to	
deteriorating	conditions	by	gradually	changing	the	terms	of	official	support	over	time.		
																																								 																				
29	On	June	2012,	euro	area	governments	agreed	to	provide	financial	assistance	to	Spain	through	the	EFSF	until	the	
ESM	became	available.	Eventually,	by	the	time	an	agreement	was	reached	the	ESM	was	operational	
30	In	line	with	the	ideas	in	Caraway	et	al.	(2012),	the	narrow	conditionality	probably	increased	the	authorities’	
programme	ownership	while	minimising	political	costs.	
31	Appendix	B	contains	brief	country-specific	summaries.	
32	Between	1999	and	2006	cross-border	assets	and	liabilities	increased	four-fold	in	the	euro	area,	leading	to	large	
increases	in	indebtedness	in	the	euro	periphery	(Lane	and	Milesi-Ferretti,	2007).	
33	The	sovereign	risk	crisis	spread	to	countries	like	Italy,	which	did	not	suffer	from	the	bust	of	an	internal	boom	
funded	with	external	imbalances,	which	had	destabilized	Greece,	Ireland,	Portugal,	Spain	and	Cyprus.	In	Italy,	the	
problem	was	the	sustainability	of	debt	in	an	environment	of	sluggish	growth.	
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In	the	case	of	Greece,	the	original	GLF	featured	a	400	bps	spread	over	funding	costs,	100	bps	
over	the	spread	charged	on	the	IMF’s	SBA	loan,	and	repayment	was	scheduled	to	start	after	5	
years.	This	surcharge	above	IMF’s	pricing	policies	reflected	moral	hazard	concerns	by	the	euro	
area	 authorities,	 related	 to	 the	 Greek	 authorities’	 lack	 of	 ownership	 of	 the	 reform	 efforts	
(Balassone	 and	 Committeri,	 2015).	 Conditions	 were	 first	 softened	 in	 June	 2011,	 when	
maturities	were	extended	by	an	additional	5	years,	and	spreads	reduced	to	those	of	the	 IMF	
loan.	 The	 second	 programme,	 signed	 with	 the	 EFSF,	 featured	 a	 much	 longer	 maturity	 and	
grace	period	(15	and	10	years	respectively)	and	an	even	lower	spread	(150	bps).	These	milder	
conditions	were	 further	extended	to	 the	GLF.34	Another	change	occurred	 in	December	2012,	
when	the	Eurogroup	amended	the	EFSF	loan	and	the	GLF.	The	main	changes	were	a	reduction	
on	 some	 fees	 and	 margins	 to	 zero,	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 programme	 size,	 an	 extension	 of	
maturities	 up	 to	 32.5	 years	 and	 a	 ten-year	 interest	 deferral.	 As	 regards	 the	 GLF,	maturities	
were	extended	to	30	years	and	margins	lowered	to	50	bps.	
Initially,	 in	 2010,	 the	 Irish	 EFSF	 programme	 featured	 IMF-comparable	maturities	 and	 higher	
spreads	(EFSF,	2010).	When	the	Portuguese	programme	was	signed	several	months	later,	using	
the	same	vehicle,	the	terms	of	the	financial	agreement	featured	a	spread	almost	50	bps	lower	
(EFSF,	 2011).	 In	 part,	 these	 lower	 charges	 reflected	 the	 fact	 that	 by	 that	 time	 the	 Greek	
programme	 was	 performing	 well	 below	 expectations,	 and	 the	 authorities	 were	 already	
discussing	 cutting	 the	 borrowing	 costs	 for	 this	 country.	 In	 any	 case,	 after	 the	 signing	 of	 the	
Portuguese	 programme,	 the	 lending	 conditions	 quickly	 underwent	 a	 profound	 revision.	 In	
particular,	 between	May	 and	 July	 2011,	 for	 both	 Ireland	 and	 Portugal,	 the	 spreads	 for	 both	
EFSF	 and	 EFSM	 loans	 were	 lowered	 and	 the	 maturities	 extended	 (European	 Commission,	
2011).	The	lending	margins	were	reduced	and	set	at	the	minimum	required	to	cover	funding.	
Given	its	originally	larger	interest	charges,	the	Irish	spread	reduction	was	almost	50	bps	larger.	
The	maturity	of	the	loans	was	extended	by	seven	years,	to	a	maximum	of	15	years.	A	further	
change	 in	 the	 financing	 terms	 of	 the	 Irish	 and	 Portuguese	 loans	 was	 implemented	 in	 April	
2013,	 with	 an	 extension	 of	 EFSF	 and	 EFSM	 loan	 maturities	 by	 an	 additional	 7	 year	 period	
(European	Union,	2013).	
From	their	inception,	ESM	programmes	have	featured	more	accommodative	terms	than	those	
provided	by	the	International	Monetary	Fund.	The	maturities	of	the	ESM	loans	stand	above	15	
years	for	Cyprus	(by	contrast,	the	IMF	contribution	to	the	programme	in	Cyprus	still	featured	a	
four	 year	 maturity),	 12.5	 year	 for	 Spain,	 and	 32	 years	 for	 Greece.	 Similarly,	 the	 borrowing	
spread	is	at	30	bps	for	Spain	and	10	bps	for	Cyprus	and	Greece.		
Beyond	the	initial	move	in	Greece	from	an	SBA	to	an	EFF	programme,	and	the	subsequent	use	
of	 EFF	 style	 agreements	 in	 Ireland	 and	 Portugal,	 IMF	 lending	 terms	 have	 not	 matched	 the	
significant	 changes	 in	 ESM	 lending	 terms,	 giving	 rise	 to	 significant	 divergences	 across	
programmes	by	 the	 two	 institutions.35	We	delve	 into	a	comparative	analysis	 in	 the	 following	
section.	
	
																																								 																				
34	The	programme	also	included	a	debt	restructuring	that	brought	100	billion	of	nominal	debt	relief	(Gulati	et	al.,	
2013).	
35	In	2016,	the	IMF	modified	its	pricing	policy.	According	to	the	new	guidelines,	longer-term	borrowing	has	become	
cheaper.	Simultaneously,	large	programmes	have	become	more	expensive	from	the	onset.	
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Table	2.	Evolution	of	the	terms	of	official	support	in	the	euro	area		
	
Vehicle
Program	
Duration
Size Loan	Maturity
Spread	over	
reference	rate¹
Program	
Type
Program	
duration
Size
Loan	
Maturity
Spread	over	3-
month	SDR
May-10 GLF 3	years 80	bill 5	years	(	+3	grace	period) 300-400	bps SBA* 3	years 30	bill 3	years 200-300	bps
June-2011 GLF 10	years 200-300	bps
March-2012 GLF 20	years	 150	bps
March-2012 EFSF 3.5	years 144.7	bill 20	years 150	bps EFF 4	years 28	bill 8	years 200-300	bps
December-2012 EFSF 30	years	(	+10	grace	period) 0	bps
December-2012 GLF 30	years	(	+10	grace	period) 50	bps
December-2010 EFSM 3	years 22.5	bill 7.5	years 250	bps
December-2010 EFSF 3	years 17.7	bill 7.5	years 250	bps EFF 4	years 22.5	bill 8	years 200-300	bps
July-2011 EFSF/EFSM 15	years 0	bps
June-2013 EFSF/EFSM 22	years
May-2011 EFSM 3	year 26	bill 7.5	years 215	bps
May-2011 EFSF 3	year 26	bill 7.5	years 210	bps EFF 4years 26	bill 5	years 200-300	bps
July-2011 EFSF/EFSM 15	years 0	bps
June-2013 EFSF/EFSM 22	years
Nov-12 ESM 2	years 100	bill** 12.5	years 30	bps - - - - -
May-13 ESM 3	years 9	bill 15	years 10	bps EFF 4	years 1	bill 4	years 200-300	bps
Sep-15 ESM 3	years 86	bill 32	years 10	bps
Cyprus
Greece
Sources:	International	Monetary	Fund,	European	Commission,	European	Financial	Stability	Facility	(EFSF)	and	European	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM).	EFSM	stands	for	European	Financial	Stability	Mechanism.*	The	SBA	program	was	
replaced	by	the	susequent	EFF.	¹	For	EFSM	loans	the	reference	rate	is	the	EU	funding	cost,	for	the	EFSF	the	EFSF's	funding	cost	and	for	the	GLF	the	6	month	Euribor.	**	Only	41.3		billion	were	actually	disbursed.	***	On	December	
2021,	the	EFSF	waived	Greece	the	payment	of	the	guarantee	commitment	fee	and	deferred	interest	payments	for	10	years.
European	Official	Support International	Monetary	Fund	Support
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
Spain
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III.	Differences	between	IMF	and	ESM	lending	frameworks	
After	having	reviewed	the	evolution	of	the	euro	area	safety	net,	in	this	section	we	outline	key	
differences	 in	 the	operational	and	 institutional	 framework	of	 the	 IMF	and	the	ESM	that	may	
have	 weighed	 on	 these	 developments.	 We	 also	 present	 some	 empirical	 evidence	 on	 the	
different	programs,	including	information	on	the	aggregate	amount	and	costs	of	official	loans,	
and	their	repayment	schedule.		
	
III.1	The	IMF	Lending	Framework	
A	core	responsibility	of	the	IMF	is	to	provide	loans	to	member	countries	experiencing	balance	
of	 payments	 difficulties.	 IMF	 lending	 aims	 to	 provide	 a	 cushion	 that	 eases	 the	 adjustment	
policies	and	 reforms	 that	a	 country	must	make	 to	 correct	 its	balance	of	payments	problems	
and	re-establish	external	viability	and	economic	stability	and	growth.	The	traditional	resolution	
of	 external	 problems	 includes,	 in	 addition	 to	 fiscal	 policy	 measures	 and	 structural	 reforms,	
adjustments	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate,	 pursued	 through	 interest	 rate	 policy	 and	 international	
reserves	management.36		
According	to	the	IMF’s	lending	framework,	first,	IMF	lending	can	only	be	provided	to	countries	
that	 are	 solvent,	 but	 suffering	 a	 temporary	 financing	 shortage;	 second,	 loans	 are	 extended	
only	 provided	 the	 country	 agrees	 on	 a	 pre-defined	 program	 of	 economic	 reforms---the	 so	
called	 conditionality.	 The	 rationale	 for	 this	 exchange,	 resources	 vs.	 conditionality,	 has	many	
layers,	all	impinging	on	Debt	Sustainability	Analysis.	
Since	IMF	lending	is	meant	to	help	solvent	countries	overcome	temporary	financing	shortages,	
its	 lending	model	 revolves	 on	 an	 assessment	 of	 debt	 sustainability,	 via	 a	 DSA	 (IMF,	 2013b).	
Prior	 to	 the	 signing	 of	 any	 loan	 agreement	 and	 to	 any	 disbursement,	 the	 IMF	 evaluates	
whether	 the	 country’s	 debt	 is	 sustainable,	 i.e.	 the	 country	 is	 able	 to	 honour	 its	 (official)	
liabilities.	 But	 this	 assessment	 is	 conducted	 conditional	 on	 complying	 with	 the	 adjustment	
policies	 included	 the	 programme.37	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 as	 subsidized	 lending	may	 reduce	 the	
authorities’	 incentives	 to	act	on	 improving	economic	 conditions,	 conditionality	measures	are	
meant	 to	 safeguard	 IMF	 resources	 by	 ensuring	 that	 the	 countries	 will	 implement	 a	 set	 of	
policies	 guaranteeing	 that	 their	 situation	will	 permit	 the	 repayment	of	 the	 IMF	 loan.	On	 the	
other	hand,	while	conditionality	is	motivated	by	the	need	to	minimize	the	risk	of	losses	for	the	
IMF,	 it	 is	 also	 fully	 consistent	 with	 the	 rationale	 for	 offering	 liquidity	 support	 to	 countries	
willing	 to	 restore	 macroeconomic	 and	 financial	 stability	 via	 costly	 budget	 corrections	 and	
reforms,	 but	 still	 vulnerable	 to	 runs	 that	 may	 undermine	 their	 ability	 to	 carry	 out	 such	
policies.38	
																																								 																				
	
37	Lending	is	conditional	on	a	country’s	debt	being	sustainable,	conditional	on:	(a)	reforms	and	policy	measures	able	
to	redress	fundamental	weaknesses,	and	(b)	the	mobilization	of	enough	financial	resources.	
38	In	the	logic	of	IMF	lending,	as	it	evolved	in	the	framework	of	a	more	general	strategy	of	fostering	policy	
cooperation,	there	is	a	third,	important,	objective	of	conditionality.	Namely,	the	IMF	is	willing	to	help	a	country	to	
solve	balance	of	payments	problems	without	resorting	to	measures	that	can	damage	its	domestic	or	international	
prosperity	(i.e.	without	resorting	to	beggar-thy-neighbor	initiatives).	
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	If	a	country	fails	the	DSA,	i.e.	the	country’s	debt	is	deemed	to	be	unsustainable,	the	IMF	will	
not	 lend	 until	 the	 country	 undergoes	 a	 debt	 restructuring	 that	 brings	 (fiscal)	 sustainability	
back.39		
The	two	IMF’s	traditional	(non-concessional)	instruments	for	crisis	resolution	are	the	Stand-By	
Arrangement	 (SBA),	 and	 the	 Extended	 Fund	 Facility	 (EFF).	 The	 SBA	 aims	 to	 help	 member	
countries	addressing	short-term	balance	of	payments	problems.	Differently	from	the	SBA,	the	
Extended	 Fund	 Facility	 (EFF)	 aims	 to	 help	 countries	 overcome	 their	 medium/longer-term	
balance	of	payments	problems.	The	latter	implies	a	longer	programme	engagement	(up	to	four	
years	instead	of	three	under	the	SBA)	and	a	longer	repayment	period	(up	to	10	years	instead	of	
the	5	years	allowed	for	the	SBA).		For	both	the	SBA	and	the	EFF,	the	lending	rate	is	tied	to	the	
Special	Drawing	Rights	(SDR)	interest	rate.	At	the	time	of	the	eruption	of	the	euro	area	crisis,	
the	IMF	charged	100	bps	for	any	loan	below	three	times	the	borrowing	country’s	quota,	on	top	
of	 the	 3–month	 SDR	 rate	 (this	 is	 known	 as	 the	 basic	 rate	 of	 charge).	 The	 Fund	 applied	 a	
surcharge	 of	 200	 bps	 for	 credit	 above	 300%	of	 the	 quota,	 and	 additional	 100	 bps	 for	 credit	
outstanding	 after	 3	 years---the	 premium	 being	 structured	 in	 order	 to	 discourage	 large	 and	
prolonged	 use	 of	 IMF	 resources.	 In	 2016,	 the	 IMF	 carried	 out	 a	 revision	 of	 the	 pricing	 and	
surcharges	on	 its	 lending	 facilities	 (IMF	2016b).	The	reform	 increased	the	 initial	cost	of	 large	
loans	by	reducing	the	threshold	above	which	loans	become	large	(previously	at	three	times	the	
quota),	while	making	it	cheaper	to	have	outstanding	balances	for	a	longer	period.	
Over	time,	along	the	process	of	financial	globalisation,	countries	became	increasingly	exposed	
to	external	financing	shocks	(usually	referred	to	as	sudden	stops	of	capital	flows),	rather	than	
to	 traditional	 trade	 balance-related	 problems.	 Faced	with	 ever	 growing	 cross-border	 capital	
flows,	the	IMF	resources	became	increasingly	inadequate	to	play	a	significant	role	in	this	new	
breed	of	crises.	In	particular,	the	size	of	the	capital	flow	reversals	during	the	Asian	crises	in	the	
late	 1990s	 made	 it	 clear	 that	 addressing	 capital	 account	 crises	 would	 require	 significant	
upfront	funding,	on	a	scale	that	could	not	be	achieved	using	standard	access,	and	would	imply	
significantly	higher	risks	for	the	IMF’s	resources.	In	2002,	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Asian	crises,	
the	IMF	approved	the	Exceptional	Access	Policy,	setting	four	criteria	countries	were	to	meet	to	
gain	exceptional	access	to	Fund	resources.40	
Since	 2009,	 the	 IMF	underwent	 further	 changes	 on	 its	 operatives	 (see	Moreno	 2014	or	 Ban	
and	Gallagher	2015).		Besides	changes	to	its	governance,	the	Fund	revised	its	supervisory	and	
lending	tools.	The	IMF	tripled	its	resources	and	acquired	larger	role	in	cross	border	issues	and	
policy	coordination.	The	IMF	also	designed	larger,	front-loaded	facilities,	some	accessible	on	a	
precautionary	 basis,	 others	 free	 of	 conditionality.41	 As	 already	 discussed,	 around	 that	 same	
period,	the	Greek	crisis	challenged	the	IMF	framework,	with	the	prospects	of	systemic	fallout	
from	 debt	 restructuring.	 The	 immediate	 reaction	 was	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 so-called	
“systemic	 exemption”	 clause	 within	 the	 exceptional	 access	 policy,	 amid	 strong	 reservations	
																																								 																				
39	The	IMF	can	lend	to	countries	in	default	through	its	lending	into	arrears	(LiA)	policy.	
40	According	to	these	requirements:	“a	rigorous	and	systematic	DSA	analysis	indicates	that	the	member’s	debt	is	
sustainable	with	high	probability	in	the	medium	term”.	
41	The	 IMF	created	two	new	 lending	 instruments.	One	 is	 the	Flexible	Credit	Line,	which	allows	countries	with	ex-
ante	good	fundamentals	to	tap	IMF	resources	without	conditionality.	The	second,	Precautionary	and	Liquidity	Line	
(PLL)	is	designed	for	countries	with	sound	economic	fundamentals	but	with	some	limited	remaining	vulnerabilities,	
which	preclude	them	from	using	the	Flexible	Credit	Line	(FCL).	For	this	reason,	it	combines	pre-qualification	with	ex-
post	conditionality	(IMF	2016a).	
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and	criticisms.	The	ensuing	debate	within	the	IMF,	crystallised	in	an	internal	evaluation	on	the	
use	of	the	Exceptional	Access	policy	in	Greece	(IMF	2013c),	led	to	a	new,	substantially	different	
rule.	 The	 exemption	was	 replaced	 by	 a	 new	 clause,	 stipulating	 that	 IMF	 involvement	 in	 the	
financing	of	countries	with	an	unsustainable	debt	burden	(according	to	the	DSA)	could	still	be	
justified,	provided	official	creditors	other	than	the	IMF	could	commit	to	cover	any	funding	gaps	
and	prevent	default	by	the	borrowing	sovereign	(IMF,	2016c).	
	
III.2	The	ESM	Lending	Framework	
Relative	to	the	IMF	lending,	there	are	a	number	of	significant	differences	that	characterize	the	
ESM.	Here	we	focus	on	three	key	aspects.42	A	first	key	distinctive	feature	of	the	euro	area	crisis	
resolution	 infrastructure	 is	 that	 programmes	 can	 address	 diverse	 problems,	 from	 fiscal	 and	
structural	 imbalances	to	banking	sector	issues,	and	not	only	external	 imbalances.	Indeed,	the	
euro	 area	 experience	 shows	 that	 crises	 may	 have	 different	 roots	 and	 reflect	 different	
imbalances	 across	 countries.	 Specifically,	 the	 ESM	 toolbox	 contains	 loans	 for	 intervening	
directly	 in	primary	and	 secondary	markets,	 loans	 for	 the	 indirect	 recapitalization	of	 financial	
institutions	 and,	 in	 exceptional	 cases,	 a	 direct	 bank	 recapitalisation	 instrument.	 For	 these	
instruments	the	focus	is	on	financial	sector	conditionality	which,	given	its	existing	chart,	is	not	
within	the	IMF	remit.	As	already	pointed	out,	the	relevance	of	this	difference	is	best	illustrated	
by	the	Spanish	programme,	which	was	designed	to	tackle	a	structural	problem	in	the	banking	
system.		
A	second	feature	is	the	nature	of	the	ESM	as	a	European	institution,	implying	that	it	may	have	
a	 stronger	 incentive	 (or	perhaps	be	 in	a	better	position)	 to	 internalize	 spillovers	both	across	
borders	and	across	type	of	borrowers	 in	the	monetary	union.	While,	analogously	to	the	 IMF,	
the	ESM	does	not	lend	against	insolvency	and	evaluates	a	country	position	ex-ante	by	means	
of	 a	 debt	 sustainability	 analysis,	 it	 may	 pay	 more	 attention	 to	 cross-border	 spillovers,	 and	
possibly	engage	with	countries	whose	debt	sustainability	is	not	guaranteed.	The	IMF	could	also	
temporarily	 do	 so	 through	 the	 systemic	 exemption	 clause,	 but	 the	 clause	 was	 removed	 in	
2016.		
A	third	important	difference	concerns	seniority.	As	of	today,	the	IMF	is	a	senior	creditor	to	the	
ESM,	 and	 both	 are	 senior	 to	 the	 private	 sector.43	 However,	 while	 ESM	 loans	 are	 senior	 to	
private	creditors,	it	has	the	capacity	to	waive	its	seniority	status,	when	it	deems	it	detrimental	
for	countries	market	access	and	the	success	of	the	programme.44	It	is	worth	noting	that	official	
support	through	the	EFSF,	a	private	entity	under	Luxembourgish	law,	was	designed	to	be	pari-
passu.	This	approach	was	modified	with	the	ESM	in	the	sense	just	described.		
																																								 																				
42	Important	differences	exist	also	in	terms	of	funding	structures.	While	the	IMF	loans	are	financed	through	the	
Fund’s	own	resources	(the	quotas	provided	by	its	member	countries),	the	euro	area	official	lenders	behave	like	
financial	intermediaries:	they	finance	programmes	by	issuing	debt	in	capital	markets.	For	a	comparative	discussion	
of	governance	and	decision-making	structures,	see	Henning	(2017)..	
43	We	note	that	the	IMF’s	senior	status	vis-à-vis	private	creditors	is	not	contractual.	For	further	information	on	the	
legal	aspects	of	seniority	within	the	euro	area,	see	Buchheit	and	Gulati	(2017)		
44	Seniority	was	indeed	waived	in	the	case	of	the	Spanish	programme.	This	is	because	the	programme	started	under	
the	EFSF	and	loan	conditions	were	grandfathered.	In	this	sense,	Spain	is	therefore	an	exception.	Seniority	applies	as	
outlined	to	the	programmes	in	Cyprus	and	Greece.	Relatedly,	cross-default	clauses	on	the	Greek	loans	were	waived	
in	the	summer	of	2016.	
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Overall,	 there	 are	 visible	 differences	 in	 the	 pricing	 and	maturity	 structures	 of	 IMF	 and	 ESM	
loans.	 To	 begin	 with,	 different	 ESM	 instruments	 present	 different	 financing	 terms,	 as	
summarised	in	Table	3.	
	
Table	3.	ESM	Pricing	structure	
	
	
		Source:	European	Stability	Mechanism	
	
The	differences	to-date	between	IMF	and	ESM/EFSF	in	the	terms	of	lending	rates	and	costs	are	
summarised	 in	 Table	 4.	 	 For	 the	 ESM,	 the	maximum	 loan	maturity	 can	 vary,	 as	 there	 is	 no	
general	 predefined	 limit	 on	 the	 maturities	 of	 loans.	 The	 size	 of	 the	 loan	 is	 agreed	 in	 the	
Memorandum	of	Understanding,	based	on	the	results	from	the	DSA.	Overall,	the	ESM	provides	
less	expensive	and	longer	lasting	funding.		
	
Table	4.	Lending	Terms:	IMF	vis-a-vis	ESM	
	
Source:	International	Monetary	Fund	and	European	Stability	Mechanism.	
	
	
Lending	Instrument Base	Rate
Margin	
(bps)
Commitment	&	
Service	Fees
Penalty	
Interest
Standard	Loans Cost	of	funding 10 Yes 200	bps
Precautionary	assistance Cost	of	funding 35 Yes 200	bps
Assistance	for	the	
recapitalisation	of	financial	
institutions
Cost	of	funding 30 Yes 200	bps
Primary	Market	Facility Cost	of	funding 10-35 Yes 200	bps
Secondary	Market	facility Cost	of	funding 5 Yes 200	bps
Loan	size Margins Maturities
Up	to	six	times	the	country's	quota	
under	standard	programs
From	100	bps	up	to	400	bps	
on	top	of	the	SDR	rate
Five	years	for	SBAs
Above	six	times	the	quota,		only	via	
exceptional	access	policy
Grows	with	the	size	and	
duration	of	the	loan
Seven	to	ten	years	for	
EFFs
Size	of	the	loan	determined	via	DSA
For	standard	loans	its	10	
bps	above	the	ESM/EFSF	
funding	cost
Effective	maturities	have	
reached	40	years	for	EFSF	
and	22.5	for	ESM
No	pre-defined	upper	limits	
	For	indirect	bank	
recapiltalisation	the	margin	
is	30	bps
No	pre-defined	limit	on	
maturities	
IMF
EFSF-ESM
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III.3	Lending	by	the	IMF	and	the	ESM	in	the	euro	area:	a	summary	
We	summarize	 key	evidence	on	official	 lending	by	 the	 two	 institutions	 to	 the	 four	 countries	
under	joint	IMF-ESM	programmes	in	Figures	1	through	3	below.45	
Figure	 1	 illustrates	 the	 increasing	 engagement	 by	 the	 euro	 area	 official	 lenders	 with	 the	
programme	countries.	 The	euro	area	official	programmes	are	 significantly	 larger	 in	 size	 than	
IMF	programmes.	Before	2011,	the	correlation	between	debt	level	and	spreads	is	positive,	as	
one	 may	 logically	 expect.	 Strikingly,	 the	 correlation	 changed	 sign	 and/or	 zeroed	 starting	 in	
2011,	 as	 the	 stock	 of	 crisis	 countries’	 public	 liabilities	 became	 increasingly	 owed	 to	 official	
creditors.	 In	 turn,	 Figure	 2	 shows	 the	 dynamics	 of	 borrowing	 costs,	 by	 sources	 of	 financing:	
marketable	 instruments,	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	 rates	 and	 the	 rate	 on	 the	 euro	 area	
facilities.	 As	 already	 discussed,	 during	 the	 first	 stages	 of	 the	 crisis,	 the	 Greek,	 Irish	 and	
Portuguese	 loans	by	the	euro	area	official	 lenders	were	more	expensive	than	those	provided	
by	 the	 IMF.	 This	 changed	 in	2011,	 as	both	 institutions	adjusted	 their	 lending	 terms	and	 IMF	
surcharges	for	large	and	long	lasting	loans	kicked	in.	Starting	mid-2012,	market	spreads	started	
to	normalise	 in	 Ireland	and	Portugal	and,	by	mid-2014,	market	rates	for	both	countries	were	
already	below	the	marginal	rates	applied	on	the	IMF	loans.46	
Figure	3	plots	the	time	profile	of	debt	repayment	flows	for	each	institution’s	loans.	The	figure	
shows	that	the	maturity	of	official	loans	has	a	direct	and	substantial	impact	on	the	repayment	
flows	in	the	coming	years.	The	euro	area	official	loans	have	a	more	back-loaded	profile.	In	fact,	
repayment	 to	 the	 IMF	 and	 the	 euro	 area	 official	 loans	 will	 be	 sequential,	 with	 euro	 area	
assistance	being	repaid,	only	after	the	IMF	loans	are	fully	amortised.		
	
IV.	A	discussion	of	selected	issues	in	theory	and	policy			
The	 European	 response	 to	 the	 crisis	 clearly	 reflects	 contextual	 and	 institutional	 specificities.	
Yet,	 it	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 laboratory	where	 policymakers	 experimented	 novel	 vehicles	 to	
deliver	official	lending	---aimed	at	fostering	debt	sustainability	and	restore	market	confidence,	
without	requiring	the	official	lender	to	bear	systematic	losses.	In	particular,	relative	to	the	IMF,	
the	 euro	 area	 experience	 appears	 to	have	placed	much	more	weigh	on	 the	management	of	
loan-related	 cash	 flows,	 as	 a	 way	 to	 foster	 policy	 efforts	 and	 adjustment	 in	 the	 borrowing	
country,	 and	 to	 offer	 ‘forward	 guidance’	 to	 private	 investors.	 This	 raises	 a	 number	 of	 key	
issues:	what	are	the	expected	benefits	and	costs	from	flexibility	on	the	terms	of	official	loans?	
Does	this	approach	require	an	evolution	of	the	models	of	official	lending,	beyond	the	classical	
model	of	liquidity	provision	to	address	self-fulfilling	runs	(catalytic	finance)?	
	
	
		
																																								 																				
45	Our	data	on	official	loans	collects	information	up	to	2016.	Since	then	there	have	been	changes	to	the	Greek	loans,	
following	the	2017	short	term	debt	relief	measures,	and	to	the	Portuguese	and	Spanish	loans	due	to	early	
repayments.	These	changes	however	do	not	substantially	affect	the	message	from	our	analysis.	
46	As	discussed	in	Corsetti	et	al.	(2017)	as	market	financing	conditions	normalised,	Portugal	and	Ireland	started	to	
cut	their	exposure	to	IMF	lending,	by	pre-paying	the	loans	and	replacing	them	with	market	financing.	
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Figure	1.	Creditor	Distribution	
	
Source:	International	Monetary	Fund	and	European	Stability	Mechanism.	ESM	debt	collects	all	of	the	euro	
area	official	loans	(GLF,	bilateral	loans,	EFSF,	EFSM	and	ESM)		
	
	
	
	
Figure	2.	Dynamics	of	borrowing	Costs	by	Creditor	Type	
	
Source:	International	Monetary	Fund	and	European	Stability	Mechanism	and	Bloomberg.	
Sources:	European	Commission,	European	Stability	Mechanism,	various	countries	Central	Banks	and	Bloomberg.	Debt	is	measured	as	percentage	of	GDP.	The	
market	rate,	measured	on	the	right	hand	side	axis	refers	to	the	spread	on	the	benchmark	10	year	sovereign	bond
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Figure	3.	Official	Debt:	Redemption	Profiles	
	
																																										Source:	International	Monetary	Fund	and	European	Stability	Mechanism.	
	
To	explore	these	issues	and	draw	some	lessons	from	the	euro	area	crisis	for	the	management	
and	resolution	of	debt	crises,	the	discussion	below	is	organized	around	the	following	headings:	
debt	 sustainability,	 market	 access,	 seniority,	 spillovers,	 bail-ins	 versus	 bailout	 and	 systemic	
considerations.	We	close	the	section	with	some	considerations	on	theoretical	models	of	official	
lending.		
A	few	caveats	are	in	order.	The	debates	we	are	commenting	on	are	by	no	means	settled.	Given	
that	official	loans	are	still	outstanding,	a	fair	degree	of	prudence	must	be	exercised	in	drawing	
lessons	 from	 the	 evidence	 available	 at	 this	 stage.	 Moreover,	 the	 goal	 of	 our	 analysis	 is	
necessarily	 limited---we	 do	 not	 aim	 to	 be	 exhaustive.	 While	 discussing	 at	 length	 some	
elements	 relevant	 to	 the	 ongoing	 debates	 on	 official	 lending,	 we	 leave	 other,	 equally	
important	 ones,	 in	 the	 background.	 Namely,	 we	 do	 not	 discuss	 how	 longer	 and	 larger	
programme	affects	conditionality,	 in	view	of	 the	 risk	of	moral	hazard	and	counterproductive	
effects	of	official	lending	on	government	incentives	to	reform	their	policies.	This	will	take	quite	
a	bit	of	targeted	work.	Neither	will	we	discuss	the	possible	risks	that	extending	the	period	over	
which	official	resources	are	committed,	as	well	as	the	size	of	the	loans,	may	rise	for	the	lending	
capacity	of	official	institutions.	Finally,	for	as	much	as	we	can	stay	away,	we	also	abstract	from	
governance	and	legal	issues.47	
																																								 																				
47	Ardagna	and	Caselli	(2014)	compares	the	governance	of	IMF	and	EC/EFSF/ESM,	and	argues	that	to	the	extent	that	
the	 IMF	 is	 largely	 a	 technocratic	 institution,	 while	 ECOFIN	 is	 made	 up	 of	 politicians,	 one	 may	 expect	 the	
management	 of	 the	 crisis	 by	 the	 EC	 to	 be	more	 affected	 by	 electoral	 concerns.	Moschella	 (2016)	 discussed	 the	
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IV.1	Sustainability	and	loans	maturity	
Assessing	 debt	 sustainability	 is	 a	 complex,	 forward-looking	 and	multidimensional	 task---	 it	 is	
well	 understood	 that	 no	 single	 indicator	 can	 provide	 reliable	 guidance.	 Yet,	 the	 level	 and	
dynamics	of	debt	stocks	have	long	played	the	leading	role	in	official	frameworks.	The	following	
quote	exemplifies	this	long-prevailing	view	(IMF,	2013b):	
	“In	 general	 terms,	 public	 debt	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 sustainable	 when	 the	 primary	
balance	 needed	 to	 at	 least	 stabilize	 debt	 under	 both	 the	 baseline	 and	 realistic	 shock	
scenarios	 is	 economically	 and	 politically	 feasible,	 such	 that	 the	 level	 of	 debt	 is	
consistent	with	an	acceptably	low	rollover	risk	and	with	preserving	potential	growth	at	
a	satisfactory	level.		Conversely,	if	no	realistic	adjustment	in	the	primary	balance—i.e.,	
one	that	 is	both	economically	and	politically	feasible—can	bring	debt	to	below	such	a	
level,	public	debt	would	be	considered	unsustainable.”		
While	 recognizing	 the	 importance	 of	 economic	 growth	 and	 roll-over	 risks,	 this	 definition	 is	
articulated	 around	 the	 level	 of	 debt,	 leading	 to	 policy	 recommendations	 along	 the	 lines	 of	
“debt	will	be	sustainable	 if	debt	stocks	 reach	 level	X	by	year	Y”.	 48	 In	practice,	moreover,	 the	
IMF´s	 DSA	 is	 guided	 by	 its	 own	 operative,	 and	 thus	 requires	 sustainability	 analysis	 to	 be	
conducted	on	a	ten	year	horizon	from	the	programme	start,	the	period	within	which	countries	
are	expected	to	repay	their	loans.	
The	euro	area	crisis,	and	the	specific	 lending	vehicles	and	structures	used	to	forestall	 it,	have	
raised	 an	 intense	 debate	 on	 the	 adequacy	 of	 this	 “stock-based	 approach”	 to	 sustainability.	
Interventions	 in	the	euro	area	have	been	motivated	with	the	notion	that,	by	deploying	back-
loaded	 loans	 and	 lowering	 re-financing	 needs,	 official	 lending	 reduces	 crisis	 countries’	
exposure	 to	 roll	 over	 crises	 and	 the	 risk	 of	 a	 disorderly	 default.	 From	 an	 analytical	 and	
theoretical	vantage	point,	the	level	of	sustainable	debt	is	highly	sensitive	to	the	maturity	and	
spread	of	official	lending---a	point	we	elaborate	in	a	Corsetti,	Erce	and	Uy	(2017).		
The	debate	on	these	issues	is	by	no	means	confined	to	the	euro	area.	In	fact,	growing	voices	of	
discomfort	with	 the	way	debt	 sustainability	has	 traditionally	been	assessed	 recently	 led	 to	a	
fine-tuning	of	DSA	 frameworks.49	Along	 the	 lines	of	 the	 IMF’s	“acceptably	 low	rollover	 risk	“,	
the	DSA	now	 takes	 a	 closer	 look	 to	 debt	 flows	 by	 also	monitoring	 an	 additional	metric	 that	
accounts	 for	 potential	 difficulties	 that	 a	 country	 may	 face	 in	 meeting	 upcoming	 financing	
needs.50	In	practice,	the	DSA	framework	now	requires	monitoring	the	so-called	Gross	Financing	
Needs	 (GFN),	 as	 these	 should	 not	 exceed	 a	 pre-set	 risk-threshold.51	 As	 a	 measure	 of	 the	
forthcoming	 financing	 needs	 of	 a	 country,	 GFN	 adds	 up	 interest	 payments,	 principal	
repayments,	the	primary	deficit,	and	other	one-off	outlays.	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
political	motivation	for	the	layered	policy	response	to	the	crisis.	In	turn,	Buchheit	et	al.	(2013)	discuss	various	legal	
aspects	related	to	the	resolution	of	the	euro	area	crisis.	
48	For	example,	within	the	2012	Eurogroup	agreement,	reaching	a	debt-to-GDP	ratio	of	124%	in	2020,	and	
remaining	substantially	lower	than	110%	in	2022,	would	ensure	Greece’s	debt	sustainability.	
49	The	Eurogroup	statement	where	it	was	agreed	that	in	evaluating	Greek	debt	sustainability	GFN	levels	needed	to	
be	monitored	can	be	found	here:	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/09-eg-
statement-greece/		
50	In	recent	years,	interest	in	the	role	of	flow	debt	metrics	for	understanding	sustainability	has	increased.	See	Dias	
et	al.		(2014),	Schumacher	and	Weder	di	Mauro	(2016),	Bassanetti	et	al.	(2016)	or	Gabriele	et	al.	(2017).	
51	According	to	the	IMF,	in	advanced	economies,	GFN	should	not	be	consistently	above	20%	of	GDP.	
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By	the	GFN	flow	metric,	different	official	lending	vehicles	can	have	very	different	implications	
for	sustainability	assessment.	To	wit:	Figures	4A	and	4B	provide	an	illustration	of	the	extent	to	
which	 official	 loans	 affected	 cash	 flows	 from	 official	 debt	 obligations,	 comparing	 the	 debt	
repayment	 profile	 by	 type	of	 creditor,	 for	 Portugal	 and	 Ireland,	 before	 and	 after	 the	official	
assistance	 programmes.	 The	 figures	 document	 a	 substantial	 smoothing	 of	 the	 repayment	
profile,	essentially	attributable	to	the	euro	area	official	loans.	Conversely,	repayments	on	IMF	
and	market	loans	remain	more	frontloaded.	
	
	
Figure	4A.	Irish	Repayment	Profiles	by	Creditor	Type	
	
Source:	Irish	Ministry	of	finance,	ESM	and	authors’	calculations	
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Figure	4B.	Portuguese	Repayment	Profiles	by	Creditor	Type	
	
	
Source:	Portuguese	Ministry	of	finance,	ESM	and	authors’	calculations	
	
	
In	turn,	Figure	5	presents	a	visual	representation	of	 interest	payments	and	refinancing	needs	
for	Portugal,	Spain,	Greece,	and	Ireland.	In	Greece	Portugal	and	Spain,	interest	payments	and	
principal	repayments	(both	GFN	components	relevant	for	sustainability	assessment)	remained	
contained	 (or	 even	 decreased)	despite	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 debt	 stocks.	 Flows	 and	 stock	
debt	metrics	actually	moved	in	opposite	directions.	
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Figure	5.	Evolution	of	debt	stocks	and	their	flow	features	
	
Source:	European	Central	Bank	and	authors’	calculations	
A	similar	pattern	emerges	follows	from	the	analysis	of	the	correlation	between	roll-over	needs	
(per	unit	of	debt)	and	the	countries	exposure	to	the	ESM/EFSF,	as	shown	in	Figure	6a.	
Figure	6a.	Official	financing	terms	and	refinancing	needs	
	
Source:	ECB,	ESM	and	authors’	calculations	
						Sources:	European	Central	Bank	and	authors'	calculations
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A	 final	 piece	 of	 evidence	 regarding	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 official	 loans	 affected	 the	 interest	
payment	from	the	existing	debt	stocks	is	provided	by	Figure	6b	(see	also	ESM	2017).	The	figure	
presents	calculations	of	the	(ceteris-paribus)	cumulative	reduction	in	nominal	interest	costs	in	
the	 period	 2011-2016	 (following	 the	 access	 to	 official	 support	 by	 the	 ESM),	 relative	 to	 both	
IMF	 and	 market	 financing.	 The	 calculations	 shown	 in	 the	 figure	 can	 be	 taken	 as	 a	 rough	
measure	of	‘savings	on	the	interest	bill’	in	percentage	of	GDP.52		
Figure	6b.	Euro	area	vs.	Market	/	IMF	-	Savings	(as	%	of	2016	GDP)	
	
Source:	ESM,	IMF	and	authors’	calculations	
As	apparent	from	Figure	6,	the	effects	of	euro	area	official	loans	on	interest	payment	flows	are	
quite	significant	relative	to	available	market	conditions.	Even	for	Spain,	whose	programme	was	
relatively	small,	the	interest	bill	was	lowered	by	one	full	percentage	point	of	GDP.	We	should	
note	 that	 the	 figure	does	not	 include	savings	 from	the	EFSM,	GLF	and	other	bilateral	official	
loans.53	While	 an	 order	 of	magnitude	 smaller,	 savings	 are	 also	 non-negligible	 relative	 to	 the	
IMF	lending	conditions.54	
On	methodological	and	conceptual	grounds,	this	new	style	of	official	 lending	faces	significant	
hurdles.	 With	 the	 lengthening	 of	 the	 lending	 horizon,	 comes	 the	 need	 for	 lengthening	 the	
horizon	of	debt	sustainability	analysis,	well	in	excess	of	the	conventional	ten-year	horizon	used	
by	 the	 IMF.55	 By	 the	 same	 token,	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 analytical	 and	 empirical	work	 on	 how	
private	expectations	respond	to	lengthening	maturities	and	reducing	spreads	on	official	loans--
																																								 																				
52	The	numbers	 in	Figure	6	are	calculated	by	comparing	each	country’s	average	sovereign	market	spread	(or	 IMF	
rate	 corresponding	 to	 a	 loan	with	 	 size	 and	maturity	 as	 that	 of	 the	 ESM/EFSF	 loan),	matching	 the	 ESM	maturity	
profile,	with	the	equivalent	EFSF/ESM	funding	cost,	and	applying	that	difference	to	the	actual	loan	by	the	EFSF/ESM.	
Following	ESM	(2015),	a	cap	of	6.4%	is	applied	to	the	market	rate.	
53	For	Ireland	and	Portugal,	given	that	the	conditions	of	the	vehicles	are	analogous,	overall	savings	might	be	
significantly	larger	
54	We	note	that	the	comparison	in	Figure	6	does	fails	to	include	the	hedging	costs	of	borrowing	on	SDR	and	the	
different	fees	the	IMF	charges.	As	they	do	include	the	fees	charged	by	the	EFSF/ESM,	we	see	the	figures	as	a	lower	
bound	on	the	amount	of	extra	savings	delivered	through	the	financing	conditions	in	the	euro	area.		
55	The	European	Commission,	whose	DSA	also	considers	demographic	factors,	extends	beyond	one	decade.	
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-again,	with	 the	understanding	 that	 the	 terms	of	official	 lending	and	agents’	 expectations	of	
sustainability	are	endogenously	tied	to	each	other.	
	
IV.2	Market	access	and	the	terms	of	official	lending:	an	event	analysis	
Since	 the	 inception	of	 the	global	 financial	 crisis,	 domestic	 and	 international	 authorities	have	
deployed	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 policies	 to	 sustain	 activity,	 re-float	 banks’	 balance	 sheet	 and	
stabilised	sovereign	bond	markets.	Central	Banks	have	brought	policy	rates	to	their	historical	
minima,	 carried	 out	 balance	 sheet	 policies	 and	 engaged	 in	 forward	 guidance;	 governments	
pursued	fiscal	accommodation.	All	these	measures	have	been	the	subject	of	numerous	impact	
analyses,	 which	 helped	 policy-makers	 understanding	 the	 effects	 of	 their	 policies	 and	 adjust	
their	interventions.	Remarkably,	however,	to	date,	there	is	virtually	no	systematic	analysis	on	
the	impact	of	euro	area	official	lending.	
We	start	focusing	on	the	efficacy	of	official	lending	in	the	euro	area	in	relation	to	the	ultimate	
objective	 of	 lending	 programmes,	 restoring	 market	 access	 at	 sustainable	 conditions.	 A	 key	
question	 concerns	 the	 extent	 to	 which,	 by	 shifting	 forward	 in	 time	 and	 smoothing	 debt	
repayment	flows,	official	loans	hold	the	potential	to	widen	the	window	for	market	financing.	
The	fact	that	euro	area	official	loans	underwent	various	changes	over	time	provides	us	with	an	
opportunity	 to	 assess	 how	market	 prices	 and	 quantities	 reacted	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 terms	 of	
official	loans.	In	this	section,	we	do	so	by	performing	an	event	analysis	of	the	market	response	
around	 the	dates	when	 the	 terms	of	official	 assistance	were	modified.	Namely,	we	 consider	
contract	changes	in	the	Irish	and	Portuguese	loans	in	2011	and	2013,	 independently	and	in	a	
comparative	fashion,	and	provide	indicators	of	how	these	changes	affected	sovereigns’	access	
to	bond	markets.	A	caveat	to	our	approach	is	that	we	do	not	control	for	alternative	factors	that	
may	have	affected	spreads	at	the	time	of	the	changes	to	the	loans.	In	the	rest	of	this	section	
we	focus	on	the	changes	in	the	first	half	of	2011,	to	avoid	that	our	results	get	confounded	by	
the	effects	of	monetary	policy	measures	like	OMT	or	the	QE	program.56		
The	 key	 changes	 in	 the	 programme	were	 already	 outlined	 in	 a	 previous	 section.	We	 repeat	
them	 here	 for	 convenience.	 Ireland	 received	 the	 first	 financial	 package,	 totalling	 85	 billion	
euros,	 in	December	2010.	Of	this,	40.2	billion	euros	were	funded	by	the	EFSF/EFSM.	 Initially,	
the	 loan	 carried	 a	margin	 of	 250	 bps	 (over	 the	 EFSF/EFSM	 funding	 costs)	 with	 a	maximum	
average	maturity	of	7.5	years.	In	July	2011,	however,	EA	members	granted	Ireland	a	reduction	
of	 the	 loan’s	 margin	 (from	 250	 bps	 to	 0)	 and	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 average	 maturity	 to	 15	
years.57	In	May	2013,	they	agreed	on	a	further	7	years	lengthening	(from	15	to	22	years)	in	the	
weighted	average	maturity	limit.	Portugal	entered	its	programme	in	May	2011.	The	size	of	the	
financial	assistance	package	was	78	billion	euro,	of	which	52	billion	had	to	be	disbursed	by	the	
EFSF/EFSM.	 At	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 programme,	 Portugal	 agreed	 to	 pay	 a	 margin	 of	 210	 basis	
points,	 with	 a	 maximum	 average	 maturity	 of	 7.5	 years.	 In	 July	 2011,	 euro	 area	 authorities	
																																								 																				
56	When	the	second	revision	to	the	terms	of	the	programmes	happened,	a	number	of	measures	by	the	ECB	had	
certainly	helped	consolidating	the	improvements	in	market	confidence.	We	briefly	comment	the	outcome	of	the	
2013	extensions	at	the	end	of	this	section,	and	present	some	graphical	information	in	the	appendix.	
57	The	initial	phase	of	official	support	to	countries	in	crisis	in	the	euro	area	occurred	amid	significant	capital	flight,	
which	the	deployment	of	official	lending	did	not	abate.	
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aligned	 Portugal’s	 terms	 to	 those	 also	 granted	 to	 Ireland.	 The	maturity	was	 extended	 to	 15	
years	 and	 the	 margin	 reduced	 to	 0	 bps.	 Finally,	 in	 May	 2013,	 also	 Portugal	 received	 an	
additional	maturity	extension	to	22	years.		
	
Sovereign	bond	pricing	
Similar	 to	 Foley-Fisher	 et	 al.	 (2016),	 we	 provide	 evidence	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 lengthening	 the	
official	 loan	maturities	by	comparing	the	dynamics	of	secondary	markets’	yields,	yield	curves	
and	market	liquidity	(bid-ask	spreads)	for	public	bonds	before	and	after	the	announcement	of	
the	loan	amendments.	We	use	secondary	market	data,	coming	from	Bloomberg,	to	analyse	the	
behaviour	at	3,	5	and	10-year	maturities.	
An	important	question	is	whether	the	market	response	differs	across	maturities,	depending	on	
the	size	of	cash	flow	relief	at	different	horizons.	As	argued	above,	maturity	extensions	work	by	
shifting	 repayments	 into	 the	 future,	 affecting	 private	 creditors’	 expectations,	 and	 thus	
potentially	 opening	 a	window	 for	 accessing	market	 finance.	We	expect	 the	effects	 of	 a	 loan	
maturity	 extension	 to	 differ	 across	maturities,	 and	 to	 be	 stronger	 over	 segments	where	 the	
extension	 actually	 lowers	 expected	 refinancing	needs	 the	most.	 This	 is	 consistent	with	what	
we	observe.	
Figures	8A	and	8B	plot	the	yield	curve	before	and	after	the	contract	amendments	in	Ireland	(in	
2011)	and	in	Portugal	(in	2011),	respectively.	Figure	9	describes	the	corresponding	changes	in	
market	liquidity	(as	measured	by	bid-ask	spreads)	one	month	after	the	announcement	of	the	
contract	amendments.	
As	shown	in	Figure	8A,	before	the	maturity	extension	and	margin	reduction	in	July	2011,	the	3-
year	 yields	 on	 Irish	 bonds	 averaged	 16.47%,	 and	 the	 yield	 curve	 was	 inverted.	 The	
announcement	of	the	changes	had	a	strong	and	long-lasting	positive	effect.	Already	after	one	
month,	all	yields	had	fallen	substantially.	After	three	months,	yields	went	down	further	and	the	
curve	 had	 flattened	 out.	 The	 curve	 shifted	 downward,	 reflecting	 overall	 better	 solvency	
prospects,	and	flattens	out,	as	the	interventions	eased	concerns	about	default.	
The	 loan	amendments	provided	a	7.5	years	window	of	reduced	debt	repayments:	 it	 is	within	
this	 window	 that	 one	 could	 expect	 the	 stronger	 effect.	 This	 is	 what	 we	 observe:	 yields	 fell	
more	for	the	3-year	and	the	5-year	maturities.		
Also	 in	the	case	of	Portugal,	by	the	time	of	the	first	 loan	modification	(July	2011),	yields	had	
risen	to	extremely	high	levels	(16.46%	on	the	3-year).	Similar	to	Ireland,	the	upper-right	panel	
on	 Figure	 8B	 shows	 that,	 after	 the	 loan	 changes,	 the	 yield	 curve	 shifted	down,	 especially	 at	
shorter	 maturities.	 The	 improvement	 only	 partly	 reversed	 in	 the	 subsequent	 two	 months.	
Reflecting	the	limited	effect	of	the	first	amendment	to	the	Portuguese	loan,	however,	the	drop	
was	half	as	large	as	that	on	Irish	bid-ask	spreads.	
The	 effect	 of	 the	 changes	 to	 the	 loan	 terms	 on	 market	 conditions	 can	 also	 be	 gauged	 by	
looking	at	the	behaviour	of	bid-ask	spreads.	Figure	9	shows	the	size	and	sign	of	changes	in	bid-
ask	spreads	in	Ireland	(2011)	and	Portugal	(2011).	
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Figure	8A.	Irish	yield	curve	dynamics	around	2011	loan	amendments	
	
Source:	ESM	(2015)	
	
Figure	8B.Portuguese	yield	curve	around	2011	loan	amendments	
	
Source:	ESM	(2015)	
	
	
After	3	months	 
Pre-announcement 
After	1	month	 
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Figure	9:	Changes	in	bid-ask	spreads	after	2011	loan	amendments	
	
Source:	ESM	(2015)	
In	the	case	of	Ireland,	bid-ask	spreads	narrowed	for	all	maturities	by	about	one	third	of	their	
pre-announcement	value	(Figure	9).	Remarkably,	 the	 largest	drops	 in	both	yields	and	bid-ask	
spreads	occurred	in	the	3	and	5-year	maturities.	However,	in	the	case	of	Portugal,	the	bid-ask	
spread	widened	over	the	5-year	maturity---yet	it	narrowed	for	the	10	year	maturity.	
At	the	time	the	second	maturity	extension	in	March	2013,	driven	by	the	ECB	initiatives	in	2012,	
the	financial	conditions	of	these	countries	were	substantially	better.	In	Appendix	C	we	present	
the	 figures	regarding	the	effect	of	 the	changes	to	 the	 Irish	and	Portuguese	 loans	 in	2013.	As	
apparent	 from	 those	 figures,	 Ireland	was	 already	 facing	 significantly	 lower	 yields	 before	 the	
programme	change	announcement.	Still,	following	the	announcement,	yields	on	the	3	and	10-
year	fell	further.	Consistent	with	the	normalisation	of	the	Irish	bond	market,	the	reduction	on	
bid-ask	 spreads	 was	 smaller.	 A	 similar	 story	 applies	 to	 Portugal.	While	 this	 country	 already	
faced	 lower	 yields	 than	 before	 in	 2013,	 the	 3-year	 yield	 fell	 immediately	 after	 the	
announcement.	After	 three	months,	 the	entire	curve	was	well	below	the	pre-announcement	
level.	In	this	case,	the	reaction	of	the	Portuguese	bid-ask	spreads	was	remarkable,	especially	in	
the	3	and	5	year	segments.	
	
Market	access		
Did	the	improvements	in	secondary	markets	documented	above	translate	into	easier	access	to	
new	 funding?	To	address	 this	question,	we	 look	at	patterns	of	debt	 issuance.	Based	on	data	
from	Dealogic,	Table	4	describes	the	dynamics	on	primary	markets,	public	and	private,	 in	the	
two	months	 preceding	 and	 the	 two	months	 following	 the	 announcements.	 The	 key	 issue	 is	
whether	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 extension	 of	 maturities	 and	 the	 reduction	 in	 interest	
payments	 benefiting	 the	 sovereign	 have	 eased	 borrowing	 conditions	 also	 for	 the	 private	
sector.	 There	 is	 in	 fact	 ample	 evidence	 that	 sovereign	 spreads	 are	 strongly	 correlated	 with	
private	borrowing	 costs,	 and	 systematically	 lead	 them	 (see	Bahaj	 (2014)	or	Brutti	 and	 Saure	
(2016)).	 Given	 the	 effects	 of	 programme	 changes	 in	 the	 secondary	markets	 for	 government	
debt,	 we	 expect	 borrowing	 to	 become	 cheaper,	 and	 available	 at	 longer	 horizons,	 to	 both	
sovereign	 and	 private	 borrowers,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 change	 in	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 loans.	 The	
evidence	is	shown	in	Tables	5	and	6.	
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Table	5:	EFSF	terms	and	the	Irish	primary	market	
	
Ireland’s	public	sector	stopped	tapping	the	primary	market	in	September	2010.	In	fact,	as	the	
programme	fully	covered	public	funding	needs,	market	re-access	did	not	happen	until	January	
2012.	 In	 Portugal,	 instead,	 the	 announcement	 of	 the	 changes	 was	 accompanied	 by	 some	
action	 in	 sovereign	primary	markets.	Two	months	after	 the	announcement,	although	at	very	
low	volumes,	the	Portuguese	public	sector	was	accessing	the	market	at	lower	yields	and	longer	
maturities	 (4.8	 versus	 3.1	 years).	 Similarly,	 after	 the	 announcement	 of	 the	 March	 2013	
maturity	extension,	 the	average	maturity	of	public	 issuance	doubled	(from	4.7	to	10.8	years)	
and,	simultaneously,	 the	volumes	 issued	also	 increased	(from	2.55	to	3	billion).	Nonetheless,	
we	should	mention	here	that	the	“snapshot”	in	the	table	may	obscure	the	fact	that,	relative	to	
Portugal,	 Ireland	 was	 overall	 more	 advanced	 in	 its	 market	 access	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	
programme,	when	the	2013	extension	kicked	in.	
Table	6:	EFSF	terms	and	the	Portuguese	primary	market	
	
	
We	 also	 document	 interesting	 dynamics	 for	 private	 sector	 financing.	 In	 Ireland,	 the	 initial	
signing	of	the	programme	did	not	help	corporates	access	the	bond	market.	Yet,	there	is	some	
evidence	 that	 the	 subsequent	 changes	 in	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 contract	 preceded	 corporates	
accessing	the	bond	market.	This	was	the	case	after	the	second	maturity	extension.	Following	
this	extension,	issuance	of	private	sector	bonds	increased	by	over	30%.	In	Portugal,	as	shown	
in	Table	6,	the	benefits	for	the	private	sector	were	even	clearer.	The	announcement	of	the	July	
Ex-ante Ex-post	 Ex-ante Ex-post	 Ex-ante Ex-post	
Signing	of	the	
programme 28-Nov-10 -- -- -- -- -- --
Maturity	and	
interest	rate 21-Jul-11 -- -- -- -- -- --
Maturity	 16-Mar-13 30.05 -- 4.15² -- 30.7 --
Signing	of	the	
programme
28-Nov-10 6.25 3.17 6.34 6.14 5.1 3.1
Maturity	and	
interest	rate
21-Jul-11 2.25 2.61 5.25 4.00 4.4 3.6
Maturity	 16-Mar-13 4.68 5.98 4.34 3.72 6.3 5.8
Ireland
Public	Sector
Private	Sector
Dealogic	and	authors '	ca lculations .	Volume	is 	expressed	in	bi l l ion	Euros .	Ex-ante	(Ex-post)	refers 	to	2	months 	before	(after)	the	announcement	of	
the	change	in	the	terms	of	the	EFSF	loan.		²	This 	average	yield	refers 	to	a 	s ingle	i ssuance	of	€5	bi l l ion.		The	remaining		€25.05	bi l l ion		were	i ssued	as 	
floating	rate	bonds .																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																								
Volume	 Yield Maturity
Change	type Date
Ex-ante Ex-post	 Ex-ante Ex-post	 Ex-ante Ex-post	
Signing	of	the	
programme 05-May-11 4.32 0.33 5.81 5.13 4.7 1.9
Maturity	and	
interest	rate 21-Jul-11 1.88 0.07 5.13 4.70 3.1 4.8
Maturity	 16-Mar-13 2.55 3.00 4.89 5.66 4.7 10.8
Signing	of	the	
programme
05-May-11 0.46 1.74 4.82 2.80 3.6 3.0
Maturity	and	
interest	rate
21-Jul-11 1.82 2.48 5.61 --¹ 3.1 4.7
Maturity	 16-Mar-13 0.97 0.61 5.89 5.60 12.3 6.0
Dealogic	and	authors '	ca lculations .	Volume	is 	expressed	in	bi l l ion	Euros .	Ex-ante	(Ex-post)	refers 	to	2	months 	before	(after)	the	announcement	of	
the	change	in	the	terms	of	the	EFSF	loan.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
¹	The	average	yield	i s 	not	avai lable	s ince	a l l 	the	bonds 	i ssued	over	the	period	were	floating	rate	bonds .
Volume	 Yield Maturity
Portugal	
Public	Sector
Private	Sector
Change	type Date
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2011	change,	 lead	to	significant	action	in	primary	markets.	After	the	first	maturity	extension,	
not	only	did	issuance	increased	markedly,	but	the	average	maturity	of	new	issuances	increased	
by	over	50%.58	This	is	indirect	but	important	evidence	on	the	working	of	official	lending.	
	
IV.3	Seniority	of	official	loans	
Under	 the	 current	 arrangements,	 the	 IMF	 is	 a	 senior	 creditor	 to	 markets	 and	 any	 other	
institution;	next	is	the	ESM,	which	however	may	decide	to	wave	its	seniority,	followed	by	the	
EFSF,	and	external	private	creditors	and	bond-holders,	all	pari	passu.59	
The	 IMF’s	 rationale	 for	 claiming	 seniority	 relates	 to	 the	 figure	of	Debtor-in-possession	 in	US	
private	bankruptcy	procedures	(Diaz-Cassou	and	Erce,	2011).	The	logical	core	of	the	argument	
is	that	official	support	(both	through	liquidity	and	conditionality)	increases	a	county’s	ability	to	
repay,	to	the	benefit	of	all	existing	creditors.	 In	exchange	for	 ‘enlarging	the	size	of	the	cake’,	
the	 official	 lender	 claims	 seniority.	 This	 line	 of	 reasoning	was	 embraced	when	 the	 ESM	was	
created	in	2011,	moving	away	from	the	pari-passu	approach	initially	pursued	through	the	EFSF.	
During	 the	 euro	 area	 crisis,	 the	 seniority	 status	 of	 official	 lenders	 became	 an	 especially	
contentious	 issue.60	The	core	problem	is	well	known:	while	seniority	serves	to	better	protect	
tax-payers	money,	 a	 key	 risk	with	 it	 is	 that	 the	 subordination	 of	 private	 investors	 can	 have	
perverse	 effects	 on	market	 access.	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 programme	 fails	 to	 increase	 the	
debtor´s	ability	to	repay,	official	sector	seniority	effectively	dilutes	private	creditors.	If	private	
investors	attribute	a	 large	probability	to	such	an	outcome,	fears	of	being	diluted	may	reduce	
their	willingness	to	roll	over	their	debt,	or	even	trigger	a	run.61	The	literature	has	shown	that	
this	 risk	 is	 especially	 relevant	 when	 the	 success	 of	 the	 programme	 is	 highly	 uncertain	 (see	
Bolton	and	Jeanne	2007	or	Saravia	2010).62	 	Arguably,	when	the	weight	of	official	creditors	is	
large,	as	it	is	the	case	in	the	euro	area	(especially	in	Greece),	it	is	more	likely	that	seniority	end	
up	having	counterproductive	effects.	As	discussed	by	Schadler	(2014),	 in	the	 IMF	experience,	
one	 way	 to	 address	 these	 issues	 consists	 of	 enhancing	 programme	 flexibility	 through	
refinancing.63	 Indeed,	 it	 is	not	 infrequent	that,	when	IMF	programmes	fail	 to	catalyse	private	
lending,	 new	 official	 funding	 is	 made	 available	 (see,	 e.g.,	 the	 discussion	 by	 Reinhart	 and	
Trebesch	2016).	Often,	however,	these	new	resources	provided	by	the	Fund	are	mainly	used	to	
																																								 																				
58	Reading	into	the	characteristics	of	new	issuances	could	be	complicated	by	the	fact	that	the	private	sector	was	
suffering	credit	rationing,	with	less	reliable	firms	shut	out	of	the	market.	To	assess	whether	this	was	an	issue,	we	
compared	the	credit	worthiness	of	private	issuers	prior	and	after	the	changes.	The	(unreported)	results	did	not	
reveal	any	systematic	change	in	the	quality	of	borrowers.	
59	It	is	unclear	the	seniority	status	of	the	EFSM.	In	turn,	according	to	Trebesch,	Schlegl	and	Wright	(2016)	official	
bilateral	lenders	should	be	the	least	senior	creditors.	
60	In	the	Greek	debt	restructuringthe	ECB	holdings	of	Greek	debt	were	spared	from	the	PSI	exercise.	Later	on,	in	the	
context	of	the	OMT	program,	however,	the	ECB	has	declared	it	would	rank	pari-passu	with	other	creditors.	
61	In	relation	to	euro	area	programmes,	this	point	was	re-iterated	by	Gros	(2010)	and	Ghezzi	(2012),	stressing	that,	
in	some	programme	countries,	the	share	of	official	debt	is	very	large	relative	to	total	liabilities.	See	e.g.	Steinkamp	
and	Westermann	(2014)	for	empirical	evidence.	
62	This	may	happen	if	implementation	of	reforms	turns	out	to	be	more	protracted	than	originally	envisaged.	Mody	
and	Saravia	 (2003)	 find	 that	 larger	 loans	deliver	 stronger	catalysis,	and	 that	a	 continued	 IMF	presence	 reinforces	
this	effect.	However,	if	excessively	lengthy,	such	presence	can	be	a	sign	of	failure,	discouraging	capital	flows.	
63	Müller	et	al.	(2016)	present	a	theoretical	framework	in	which	it	is	optimal	for	the	official	sector	to	reschedule	its	
loans	if	programme	performance	is	not	sufficient	to	guarantee	the	debtor’s	solvency.	
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refinance	previous	official	 loans.	Critics	stress	that,	when	this	 is	case,	 the	problems	 inherited	
by	outstanding	programmes	that	under-perform	may	limit	the	capacity	of	new	IMF	lending	to	
catalyse	private	funding,	and	undermine	the	status	of	the	IMF	as	an	impartial	decision	maker	
(see	 e.g.,	 Simpson	 2006).	 The	 IMF’s	 own	 exposure	 may	 complicate	 its	 role	 in	 impartially	
assessing	 and	 defining	 what	 is	 needed	 for	 a	 programme	 to	 succeed	 (Diaz-Cassou	 and	 Erce,	
2011).		
A	different,	more	direct	approach	however	consists	of	managing	the	financial	terms	of	official	
loans	ex	ante.	In	particular,	in	managing	repayment	flows,	an	important	concern	to	address	is	
that	seniority	combined	with	policy	uncertainty	can	discourage	market	financing	in	periods	and	
circumstances	in	which	the	country	faces	significant	official	repayments.	
In	the	recent	experience	in	the	euro	area,	flexible	lending	conditions	and	terms	appeared	to	be	
set	with	 a	 view	of	 smoothening	 repayment	 schedules	 to	 avoid	 substantial	 overlaps	with	 the	
IMF.	When	 the	 loan	 structure	 is	 rigidly	 front-loaded,	 indeed	 repayments	may	 kick	 in	 exactly	
when	 a	 country	 is	 trying	 to	 re-enter	 the	market---see	 the	 experience	 of	 Greece	 during	 the	
summer	of	2016,	when	bond	repayments	became	due	in	tandem	with	IMF	loan	repayments.			
In	 short,	when	official	 loans	 are	 large,	 it	 is	 particularly	 important	 to	 set	 the	 terms	of	official	
lending	as	to	address	possible	issues	raised	by	seniority.	This	argument	adds	to	a	related	one,	
concerning	 the	need	 to	create	 incentives	and	allow	 for	enough	 time	 for	 countries	 to	 rebuild	
fiscal	and	economic	capacity.64	Of	course,	there	are	trade-offs	and	the	success	of	the	strategy	
relies	on	the	extent	to	which	national	policymakers	are	willing	and	able	to	take	advantage	of	
additional	room	for	fiscal	manoeuvre	to	enhance	their	reform	efforts	and	return	to	growth.		
The	traditional	concern	regarding	the	potential	for	official	support	to	generate	moral	hazard,	in	
the	 form	 of	 both	 market	 under-pricing	 of	 risks	 (under	 expectations	 of	 a	 bail-out)	 and	 a	
government	 reluctance	 to	 implement	 costly	 reforms,	 may	 have	 even	 more	 bite	 if	 lending		
conditions	are	accommodative.	While	do	not	delve	 into	 this	 issue,	 the	design	of	programme	
conditionality	adequate	to	loans	with	long	maturities	and	overall	accommodative	terms	clearly	
defines	important,	uncharted	areas	of	analysis.		
	
IV.4	Private	Sector	Involvement	and	systemic	considerations	in	Monetary	Unions	
When	the	initial	SBA	programme	for	Greece	was	agreed	upon,	the	IMF’s	staff	showed	that	the	
country	did	not	pass	the	debt	sustainability	analysis	(DSA)	in	most	scenarios.	According	to	the	
Exceptional	Access	Policy	(EAP)	guidelines	existing	at	the	time	(given	the	very	large	size	of	the	
prospective	 program)	 Greece	 could	 not	 access	 IMF	 funds	 without	 engaging	 in	 a	 debt	
restructuring	 exercise	 of	 its	 privately	 held	 public	 debt	 (often	 referred	 to	 as	 Private	 Sector	
Involvement,	 PSI).	 This	 view	was	 by	 no	means	 unchallenged.	 There	was	 deep	 disagreement	
among	official	 creditors	members	on	 the	need	 to	 restructure	Greece‘s	mounting	public	debt	
(IMF,	2013d).	
																																								 																				
64	Bulow	and	Geanakoplos	(2017)	present	a	similar	argument.	In	their	view	“"[...]	there	is	a	limit	to	the	pace	of	
reform	and	the	ensuing	acceleration	of	growth”.	Instead,	we	speak	of	more	protracted	period	of	structural	
adjustment/rebalancing.	
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Policymakers	within	and	outside	the	euro	area	were	not	prepared	to	entertain	the	prospect	of	
a	 credit	 event	 in	 an	 OECD	 economy.	 In	 the	 shadow	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 Lehman	 Brothers	
bankruptcy,	many	feared	that	PSI	in	an	advanced	country	would	be	interpreted	as	a	template	
to	 be	 followed	 by	 other	 stressed	 economies,	 triggering	 contagion.	 Relatedly,	 others	 feared	
that,	 given	 the	degree	of	 financial	 interconnectedness	within	 the	euro	area	and	exposure	of	
global	lenders	to	Greece,	spillovers	would	destabilise	the	still	shaky	European	banking	sector.	
These	 were	 strong	 arguments	 that	 translated	 into	 heavy	 political	 pressures	 on	 the	 IMF,	
emphasizing	the	need	to	act	swiftly	to	avoid	another	global	financial	meltdown.		
Indeed,	in	the	face	of	this	pressure,	the	Fund	agreed	to	co-finance	the	first	Greek	programme	
despite	the	negative	DSA	results.	As	already	discussed,	to	approve	the	Greek	programme,	the	
Board	modified	the	EAP’s	access	conditions,	to	include	the	systemic	exemption.	To	understand	
this	remarkable	change	in	the	terms	of	 lending,	 it	 is	 important	to	consider	that,	 in	 important	
dimensions,	the	euro	area	countries,	advanced-economies	members	of	a	monetary	union,	do	
not	 fit	 the	 profile	 of	 a	 standard	 IMF	 programme	 country.	 Not	 only	 monetary	 policy	 and	
exchange	rate	adjustment	are	off	 the	table.	The	 level	of	 integration	and	 interconnectedness,	
both	 real	 and	 financial,	 is	 far	 greater	 than	 in	 any	 other	 world	 region.65	 The	 two-year	 delay	
before	pursuing	any	PSI	 in	the	euro	area	 indeed	reflected	widespread	concerns	that	calling	a	
debt	restructuring	would	have	had	larger	costs	than	attempting	to	address	the	crisis	through	
the	 standard	 combination	 of	 domestic	 adjustment	 and	 official	 support	 (see	 Buchheit	 and	
Gulati	2017	or	IMF	2014).66		
Based	on	two	key	arguments,	the	IMF’s	own	assessment	of	its	role	in	Greece	was	sanguine.	If	
solvency	 is	 not	 guaranteed,	 the	possibility	 that	 large	 amounts	of	 official	 funds	 end	up	being	
used	to	bail-out	private	creditors	would	put	the	role	of	IMF	as	official	lender	at	risk.	Moreover,	
as	 these	 interventions	 reduce	 exposure	 of	 private	 lenders	 to	 the	 crisis	 country,	 they	
correspondingly	 decrease	 the	 scope	 for	 risk	 sharing	 between	 investors	 and	 borrowing	
countries,	through	either	refinancing	or	debt	restructuring	(see	IMF	2014).67		
Correspondingly,	 the	 solution	 went	 into	 two	 different	 directions.	 First,	 the	 exemption	 was	
dropped	 and	 replaced	 by	 the	 requirement	 that	 other	 official	 creditors	 commit	 to	 cover	 any	
financing	 gaps.	 This	 new	 approach	 can	 be	 motivated	 and	 rationalized	 observing	 that,	 if	 a	
																																								 																				
65	The	trade-off	between	competitiveness	and	financial	stability	complicates	the	management	of	legacy	debt.	
Absent	the	nominal	exchange	rate	adjustment	channel,	countries	could	rely	more	heavily	on	internal	depreciation	
via	wage	and	price	adjustment	channels.	However,	given	that	most	private	liabilities	are	denominated	in	the	
common	currency,	internal	devaluation	would	exacerbate	balance	sheet	problems	of	households	and	firms.	Indeed,	
as	discussed	by	Corsetti	(2010)	and	Krugman	(2011),	there	is	a	form	of	“original	sin”	in	the	euro	area:	pro-
competitive	devaluation	systematically	raises	the	burden	of	private	debt,	adding	to	the	cost	of	adjustment.	
Moreover,	on	empirical	ground,	recent	unsettling	evidence	for	the	US	suggests	lack	of	internal	real	exchange	rate	
adjustment:	the	price	level	in	regions	which	suffered	the	deepest	bite	from	the	recession	does	not	fall	relative	to	
other	regions.	This	evidence	raises	some	issues	regarding	the	extent	to	which	this	adjustment	margin	can	be	relied	
upon,	once	countries	share	a	common	currency.		
66	In	retrospect,	there	is	consensus	on	the	fact	that,	at	the	very	start	of	the	crisis,	the	Greek	debt	problem	did	not	
appear	solvable	without	contributions	by	private	sovereign	creditors	(IMF,	2014).	While	there	were	pressing	
arguments	for	avoiding	a	credit	event	for	some	time	(as	discussed	in	the	text),	PSI	was	eventually	necessary.	The	
delay	was	not	costless	however.	Given	that	the	authorities	were	forced	to	conduct	a	debt	buyback	a	few	months	
after	the	PSI	exercise,	there	is	scope	to	argue	that	Greece	debt	relief	was	too	little.	Additionally,	the	PSI	did	not	
lower	substantially	the	debt	stock	because,	by	then,	large	parts	of	the	debt	had	migrated	to	the	domestic	financial	
system	and	the	official	sector.	
67	Bulow	et	al.	(1992)	discusses	official	sector	burden-sharing	in	the	former	Soviet	Union.	
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country	 should	 be	 bailed	 out	 to	 avoid	 significant	 systemic	 consequences	 and	 cross-border	
spillovers,	the	most	affected	countries	should	be	(rationally)	willing	to	intervene	and	prevent	a	
crisis,	at	least	up	to	the	costs	they	would	suffer	as	a	consequence	of	the	crisis	(see	Tirole	2015).	
The	 argument	 implicitly	 assumes	 that	 these	 costs	 can	 be	 internalized	 more	 effectively	 via	
official	arrangements	at	regional	or	global	levels,	rather	than	via	IMF.	
Second,	 concerned	with	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 increasing	degree	of	bail-in	both	distorted	market	
incentives	 (de	 facto	 provides	 a	 blank	 check	 to	 the	 market)	 and	 put	 taxpayers’	 money	 into	
jeopardy,	 the	 Fund	 called	 for	 mechanisms	 for	 engineering	 voluntary	 bail-ins	 (IMF	 2013).	 In	
cases	 where	 sustainability	 is	 uncertain,	 a	 voluntarily	 roll-over	 would	 reduce	 the	 volume	 of	
Funds	 required	 from	 the	 official	 sector,	 while	 guaranteeing	 that	 the	 private	 sector	 retains	
some	skin	on	 the	game.	Examples	of	virtuous	cooperation	 (Turkey	 in	 the	early	2000s,	or	 the	
Vienna	Initiative	in	Eastern	Europe	at	the	beginning	of	the	global	crisis)	were	used	to	suggest	
that	such	a	strategy	is	feasible	and	effective.		
There	are,	however,	views	expressing	strong	reservations	on	the	 idea	that	 the	private	sector	
would	voluntarily	participate	 in	mechanisms	of	bail-ins.	A	number	of	proposals,	 for	 instance,	
calls	for	more	automaticity,	in	the	form	of	(soft)	restructurings	(sometimes	referred	to	as	debt	
reprofiling)	 to	 accompany	 official	 lending.68	 The	 core	 argument	 in	 favour	 of	 automaticity	 is	
that,	provided	it	can	be	credibly	 implemented	ex	post,	 it	would	enhance	market	discipline	ex	
ante,	and	thus	deliver	 long	run	benefits	 in	 the	 form	of	a	 lower	 incidence	of	crises	 (Andritzky	
and	Schumacher	2016).	The	core	criticism	is	that	automaticity	could	exacerbate	pro-cyclicality	
(Strauch	 2017).	 The	 terms	 of	 this	 debate	 are	well	 understood	 (on	 the	 IMF’s	 framework,	 for	
instance,	a	similar	discussion	has	developed	around	the	fact	DSA	unavoidably	foreshadows	the	
possibility	 of	 sovereign	 debt	 restructuring).	 If	 official	 support	 would	 be	 even	 more	 closely	
associated	 with	 debt	 restructuring,	 the	 prospect	 of	 an	 official	 programme	 may	 worsen	 the	
coordination	 problem	 among	 investors	 and	 accelerate	 capital	 flights,	 making	 the	 official	
intervention	all	more	likely.	On	balance,	there	is	no	guarantee	that	in	reaction	to	prospective	
(even	mild)	debt	reprofiling,	investors	would	not	rush	for	the	exit,	leaving	the	official	sector	at	
a	cross-road.69		
The	design	of	frameworks	improving	the	reliability	of	debt	sustainability	analysis,	together	with	
the	analysis	of	 costs	 and	 cross-border	 spillovers	 from	debt	 restructuring,	define	another	 key	
area	 in	 urgent	 need	 of	 empirical	 and	 theoretical	 work.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 going	 into	 the	
direction	 of	 making	 the	 link	 between	 official	 lending	 and	 debt	 restructuring	 mechanical	 is	
bound	 to	 magnify	 the	 risks	 of	 perverse	 effects	 (which,	 in	 a	 currency	 union	 among	 highly	
interdependent	 economies,	 can	 easily	 become	 systemic).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 when	 debt	 is	
clearly	not	sustainable,	delays	in	dealing	with	it	come	at	increasing	costs	for	taxpayers.70	All	in	
																																								 																				
68	Corsetti	et	al.	(2015),	the	German	Council	of	Economic	Experts	(Andritzky	et	al.	2016)	and	the	Bundesbank	
(Bundesbank	2016)	have	recently	issued	proposals	in	this	vein.	Also	the	European	Economic	Advisory	Group	(EEAG	
2011)	proposed	a	three-staged	mechanism.	In	the	first	one,	the	mechanism	provides	two-year	official	lending	crisis.	
This	is	followed	by	a	second-stage	where	maturing	bonds	are	restructured	with	haircuts	to	mirror	secondary	market	
prices.	In	the	third	stage,	if	default	cannot	be	avoided,	there	is	a	full	restructuring.	
69	Maturity	extensions	have	been	used	in	past	liability	management	exercises.	Earmarking	it	as	a	specific	technique	
when	sustainability	is	at	risk	could	be	understood	as	“overly	pre-emptive”	and	lack	creditor	support,	or,	even	more	
negatively,	it	could	be	understood	as	“more	to	come”,	increasing	uncertainty.	
70	 It	 is	 worth	 stressing	 that,	 within	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 monetary	 union,	 the	 rule-book	 of	 the	 ESM	 explicitly	
contemplates	 insolvency	 as	 a	potential	 scenario,	 i.e.,	 sovereign	defaults	 cannot	be	 ruled	out.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	
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all,	 the	 question	 is	 how	 to	 engineer	 a	 mix	 of	 bail-ins	 and	 bail-outs	 that	 creates	 the	 right	
incentive	 for	 the	 private	 sector	 to	 keep	 lending	 to	 the	 country	 (ex	 ante),	 while	 providing	
sufficient	insurance	against	adverse	contingencies	(ex	post).	
	
IV.5	Models	of	official	lending	beyond	catalytic	finance	
The	ultimate	objective	of	official	lending	and	conditionality	is	to	restore	market	access	by	the	
borrowing	country.	As	described	in	IMF	(2014),	a	long-standing	model	of	official	lending	relies	
on	 the	 idea	 of	 catalytic	 finance,	 i.e.	 official	 loans	 are	 meant	 to	 catalyse	 private	 investors’	
financing.71	 Since	 countries	 resorting	 to	 the	 IMF	 typically	 face	 difficulties	 in	 servicing	 its	
external	 debt,	 the	 IMF	 programmes	 are	 designed	 to	 address	 this	 external	 financing	 gap	 by	
providing	liquidity,	while	at	the	same	time	foster	reforms	and	strengthening	fundamentals.	
Given	the	goal	of	restoring	market	access---the	usual	argument	goes---it	is	crucial	to	avoid	that	
the	crisis	country	becomes	“dependent”	on	the	concessional	 terms	of	official	 lending.	Hence	
the	horizon	of	 the	 IMF	programmes	 is	 limited	 to	a	 few	years,	with	a	pricing	 schedule	 that	 is	
increasing,	both	 in	size	and	over	time,	as	an	 incentive	for	the	authorities	to	repay	early	 (IMF	
2016b).72	
As	key	motivation	and	conceptual	underpinning	of	the	catalytic	finance	model	 lies	 in	the	fact	
that	 economies	 are	 vulnerable	 to	 liquidity	 crisis,	 whereas	 private	 investors	 coordinate	
expectations	 on	 default	 that	 is	 not	 justified	 by	 economic	 fundamentals,	 but	 is	 the	 result	 of	
belief-driven	 runs	 on	 a	 country’s	 sovereign	 bond	market.73	However,	 as	 discussed	 by	 recent	
contributions	by	Tirole	(2015),	Niepmann	and	Schmidt	Eisenlohr	(2013),	and	Corsetti,	Erce	and	
Uy	 (2017),	 what	 motivates	 official	 support	 needs	 not	 be	 limited	 to	 the	 model	 of	 catalytic	
finance.	 The	 importance	 of	 this	 point	 for	 the	 euro	 area,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 global	 institutions,	
cannot	be	overstated.	
A	key	rationale	for	going	beyond	catalytic	finance	builds	on	the	observation	that	default	by	one	
country	may	have	 large	 spillovers	abroad,	 causing	output	and	 financial	 costs	across	borders.	
Because	of	these	costs,	 it	 is	rational	 for	foreign	governments	to	 intervene	and	help	the	crisis	
country	 to	 service	 its	 debt,	 at	 least	 up	 to	 the	 full	 extent	 of	 the	 costs	 they	may	 suffer	 if	 the	
country	 defaults.	 In	 this	 setting,	 spillover	 costs	 play	 the	 role	 of	 ‘collateral’,	 against	 which	 a	
country	 can	 increase	 its	 borrowing.	 In	 this	 context,	 some	 form	 of	 self-interested	 solidarity	
motivated	 by	 spillovers	 is	 arguably	 unavoidable.	 But	 when	 deployed	 in	 a	 decentralized,	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
ESM	guidelines	are	in	line	with	IMF	procedures:	when	the	debt	burden	is	assessed	to	be	unsustainable,	a	bailing-in	
of	private	creditors	must	be	part	of	the	deal.		
71	In	the	literature	(see	Corsetti	et	al.	2006),	this	is	represented	by	agreements	where	private	and	official	lending	
have	complementarities.	
72	In	fact,	in	the	design	of	IMF	programmes,	market	re-access	is	assumed	to	happen	within	the	programme	horizon.	
73	 Although	 the	 coordination	 mechanism	 is	 not	 sufficiently	 understood,	 the	 literature	 has	 long	 recognized	 the	
pervasiveness	of	the	problem	(Calvo	1988,	Cole	and	Kehoe	2000),	increasingly	so	after	the	global	crisis	(Corsetti	and	
Dedola	 2016,	 Lorenzoni	 and	Werning	 2015,	 Aguiar	 et	 al	 2016,	 Uy	 2017).	 Empirically,	 the	 evidence	 for	 catalytic	
effects	of	official	 lending	is	weak	and	controversial	(see	Birds	and	Rowlands	2003	or	Edwards	2006).	This	may	not	
come	as	a	surprise.	In	practice,	fundamental	weaknesses	and	belief-driven	crises	are	strictly	interwoven,	and	crises	
are	never	clear	cut	 instances	of	one	of	the	two.	Even	when	a	crisis	starts	as	purely	belief-driven,	the	dynamics	of	
investment	and	saving	will	be	affected,	leading	to	worsening	fundamentals,	regardless	the	non-fundamental	origin	
of	the	crisis.		
Page	|	36		
	
uncoordinated	 fashion,	 it	 is	 far	 from	 efficient.	 The	 contribution	 by	 Tirole	 (2005)	 shows	 that	
there	are	ample	margins	 for	 improving	social	welfare,	by	designing	common	institutions	that	
combine	prospective	bailouts	with	some	ex-ante	discipline	on	the	size	of	borrowing.74		
In	 Corsetti	 Erce	 and	 Uy	 (2017),	 we	 pursue	 a	 similar	 idea,	 but	 from	 a	 different	 angle.	 Our	
starting	point	 is	not	 the	possibility	of	cross-border	spillovers,	but	 the	 large	costs	 that	default	
entails	 for	 the	 crisis	 countries	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Borensztein	 and	 Panizza	 2009,	 Trebesch	 and	 Zabel	
2014	or	Cruces	and	Trebesch	2013).	Suppose	that,	for	some	social	welfare	considerations,	an	
institution	wants	to	minimize	default,	either	because	this	typically	causes	a	waste	of	resources,	
or	because	there	are	spillover	risks	that	are	however	difficult	to	quantify.	The	question	we	ask	
is	 how	 an	 official	 lending	 institution	 can	 design	 bailouts	 that	 raise	 debt	 sustainability	 and	
improve	efficiency	in	the	face	of	fundamental	risk	of	default.		
Intuitively,	an	official	programme	following	our	design	turns	 large	wasteful	default	costs	 into	
‘collateral’	against	which	the	country	can	borrow	from	an	official	 lender.	Programmes	can	be	
designed	 as	 to	 make	 the	 country	 indifferent	 between	 loosing	 output	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	
default,	and	using	output	to	service	 its	official	debt.	The	 lending	 institution	gives	the	country	
the	 opportunity	 to	 avoid	 wasteful	 losses	 associated	 with	 default,	 by	 choosing	 to	 enter	 a	
programme	 entailing	 caps	 on	 its	 borrowing.	 In	 exchange,	 the	 rate	 of	 return	 charged	 on	 the	
official	 loans	must	 create	 an	 economic	 incentive	 for	 the	 country	 to	 enter	 voluntarily	 in	 the	
deal.	 An	 outline	 of	 the	 mechanism,	 together	 with	 the	 requirements	 for	 the	 successful	
implementation,	is	detailed	in	Appendix	D.		
The	analysis	leaves	at	least	three	important	areas	for	research	open.	First,	the	bailout	must	be	
desirable	from	the	perspective	of	the	 lending	 institution.	This	raises	the	 issue	of	defining	the	
objective	function	of	such	institution.	This	passage	is	crucial	for	assessing	the	risk	of	potential	
losses	against	the	benefits	of	‘saving	on	wasteful	default	costs’.	Second,	removing	the	‘market	
discipline’	 of	 default,	 a	 bailout	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 fundamental	 default	 creates	 adverse	
incentives.	This	raises	issues	in	conditionality	and	program	credibility.		
The	last	question	concerns	potential	trade-offs	between	enhancing	market	access,	raising	debt	
sustainability,	 and	 long	 run	 inefficiencies	 associated	with	 higher	 overall	 level	 of	 debt.	 As	we	
show	in	Corsetti	et	al	2017,	official	loans	can	be	designed	to	increase	the	debt	levels	at	which	
the	country	is	sheltered	from	self-fulfilling	crises.	To	the	extent	that	higher	debt	sustainability	
leads	 a	 government	 to	 issue	 more	 debt,	 this	 reduces	 long	 run	 consumption,	 making	 the	
country	 more	 vulnerable	 to	 fundamental	 risk.	 For	 bad	 fundamentals,	 default	 occurs	 more	
often.	 This	 trade-off	 between	 sheltering	 the	 country	 from	 rollover	 risk	 and	 creating	 the	
conditions	 for	more	 fundamental	default	 can	be	ameliorated	exactly	 in	 the	way	 that	current	
IMF	programme	design	does,	 via	quantity	 constraint	on	debt	 issuance,	 as	a	precondition	 for	
accessing	official	support.	
	
	
																																								 																				
74  Tirole	(2015)	also	explores	whether	these	spillovers	may	provide	theoretical	foundations	for	some	form	of	
common	bond	issuance	in	a	monetary	union.	Marin	(2017)	extends	Tirole	(2015)	to	include	roll-over	risk.	
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V.	Conclusions	
Since	the	onset	of	the	crisis,	the	euro	area	engaged	in	a	process	of	institutional	development	
that,	over	time,	resulted	in	a	different	framework	for	crisis	resolution	relative	to	the	standards	
of	 the	 International	 Monetary	 Fund.	 This	 paper	 documents	 how	 the	 incremental	 official	
response	to	the	unfolding	crisis	brought	to	the	spotlight	a	number	of	unresolved	issues	in	the	
design	of	official	support.	It	also	discusses	how	the	euro	area	experience	can	inform	the	role	of	
the	 official	 sector	 in	 the	 resolution	 of	 future	 crises,	 holding	 lessons	 for	 global	 and	 other	
regional	safety	nets.	
The	 euro	 area	 crisis	 has	 certainly	 enriched	 the	 debate	 on	 official	 lending	 in	 novel	 crucial	
dimensions.		A	first	dimension	concerns	the	need	to	recognize	that	debt	sustainability	and	the	
extent	 to	which	 official	 support	 programmes	 are	 successful	 in	 restoring	 growth	 and	market	
access,	 vary	 substantially	 with	 the	 terms	 of	 official	 support	 (see	 also	 Dias	 et	 al.	 2014	 or	
Gabriele	 et	 al.	 2017).	 In	 our	 view,	 improving	 official	 assistance	 requires	 a	 much	 better	
understanding	of	how	cash	flow	obligations	impact	on	the	sustainability	of	any	given	stock	of	
liabilities,	and	help	countries	implementing	growth	and	stability	policies.	
A	 second	 dimension	 concerns	 the	 need	 for	 reconsidering	 the	 goals	 of	 official	 lending.	 The	
traditional	approach	builds	on	the	 idea	that	financial	assistance	has	catalytic	effects,	 i.e.,	 it	 is	
functional	 to	maintain	or	 recreate	market	access.	The	recent	experience	with	official	 lending	
however	 suggests	 that	 programmes	 can	 also	 be	motivated	on	 two	 additional	 grounds.	 First,	
official	supports	helps	preventing	systemic	costs	due	to	cross-border	spillovers	from	default	in	
one	country.	Spillovers	motivate	forms	of	self-interested	solidarity.	But	this	can	nonetheless	be	
made	more	effective	through	international	policy	coordination	(see,	e.g.,	Tirole	2015).	Second,	
official	 support	 may	 also	 be	 motivated	 by	 the	 desire	 to	 avoid	 overall	 wasteful	 costs	 and	
distress	from	default	(whether	systemic	or	in	one	country).	This	point	may	become	especially	
relevant	when	the	size	of	overall	costs	and	distress	from	credit	events	is	uncertain	but	feared	
to	be	large.	Both	arguments	have	been	centre-stage	in	the	debate	on	the	euro	area	crisis.	
Correspondingly,	however,	there	are	important	trade-offs,	sometimes	invoked	as	reasons	not	
to	deploy	official	 lending---but	more	appropriately	 to	be	seen	as	constraints	 in	 the	design	of	
better	 official	 programmes.	 The	 traditional	 one	 is	 moral	 hazard,	 i.e.	 the	 risk	 that	 official	
support	has	perverse	incentives	on	governments	and	firms,	to	take	on	excessive	risk	and	not	to	
undertake	 costly	 actions	 that	 can	 minimize	 default.	 Long	 maturities	 of	 official	 debt,	 in	
particular,	can	create	incentives	to	postpone	adjustment	and	thus	act	as	a	deterrent	on	private	
investment.	Second,	because	of	seniority,	official	lending	may	have	counterproductive	effects	
on	private	investors’	participation,	even	triggering	capital	flight.	This	risk	is	feared	to	be	rising	
in	the	size	of	official	programme.	Last	but	not	least,	protected	by	a	safety	net,	countries	may	
accumulate	 too	 much	 debt	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 make	 default	 more	 likely	 under	 fundamental	
stress.	Again,	not	surprisingly,	all	these	“counterarguments”	have	also	been	centre-stage	in	the	
debate	on	the	euro	area	crisis.	
The	 recent	 European	 experience	 has	 shown	 novel	 solutions	 and	 possibilities	 in	 addressing	
these	trade-offs,	e.g.	related	to	seniority	problem	and	the	“breathing	time”	for	reforms.	While	
the	extent	of	success	is	an	empirical	issue	that	will	be	settled	in	time,	there	is	little	doubt	that	
the	development	of	a	euro	area	official	lending	framework	has	provided	a	crucial	contribution	
to	the	resilience	of	the	euro	area.	
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Appendix A: Institutional coordination in programme design 
The	 Institutions	 refers	 to	 the	 team	 of	 representatives	 of	 the	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	
(IMF),	 the	 euro	 area	 Commission	 (EC)	 and	 the	 euro	 area	 Central	 Bank	 (ECB)	 in	 charge	 of	 a	
country’s	 programme.75	 This	 team	 is	 the	 vehicle	 for	 negotiation	 and	 financial	 evaluation	
(Pisani-Ferry	et	al.,	2013).	Assessments,	although	separately	prepared	by	IMF	and	EC,	in	liaison	
with	 the	 ECB,	 are	 shared	 and	 jointly	 discussed.	 Negotiations	 are	 also	 carried	 jointly	 and	
decisions	are	taken	simultaneously.	The	resulting	country	strategy	is	represented	on	the	Letter	
of	Intent	that	the	authorities	submit	to	the	IMF,	EC,	ECB	and	the	president	of	the	Euro	group.	
Following	standard	IMF	procedures,	in	addition	to	the	Letter	of	Intent,	the	authorities	submit	
to	 the	Board	of	 the	 International	Monetary	Fund	a	Memorandum	of	Economic	and	Financial	
Policies	(MEFP),	spelling	out	the	policy	strategy,	policy	actions	and	numerical	targets.	 In	turn,	
the	 EC	 requests	 authorities	 to	 submit	 a	 Memorandum	 of	 Understanding	 (MoU)	 with	 more	
detailed	and	specific	conditionality.	While	MoU	and	MEFP	aren’t	identical,	they	are	consistent	
with	 each	 other.	 One	 important	 implication	 of	 this	 difference	 is	 that	 the	 conditionality	
imposed	by	the	IMF	is	narrower	than	that	of	the	European	Commission.	
Table	A1	summarizes	the	division	of	labour	in	programme	design.	While	there	is	no	systematic	
evidence	 on	 the	 division	 of	 labour,	 the	 IMF	 has	 more	 experience	 with	 the	 provision	 of	
assistance	 and	 the	 European	 Commission	 has	 more	 expertise	 on	 euro	 area	 economic	 and	
structural	features.	As	regards	 lending,	 it	 is	provided	both	by	the	IMF	and	any	(or	various)	of	
the	euro	area	lending	facilities	(EFSM,	EFSF	or	ESM).	As	this	paper	has	discussed,	IMF	and	euro	
area	official	support	come	with	different	financial	terms.	Partly	as	a	result,	also	disbursement	
decisions,	despite	being	coordinated,	are	made	separately	by	the	International	Monetary	Fund	
Executive	Board	(following	standard	practice)	and	the	Euro	Group	(through	the	Euro	Working	
Group).76		
Table	A1:	Division	of	Labour		
	
When	compared	with	its	role	on	non-euro	area	countries,	where	in	addition	to	negotiating	and	
designing	the	conditionality,	it	borrows	from	the	markets	the	money	to	be	lent,	the	role	of	the	
European	 Commission	 is	 narrower	 within	 the	 euro	 area,	 where	 it	 has	 authority	 to	 provide	
funds	only	for	the	European	Financial	Stabilisation	Mechanism.		
The	role	of	the	EFSF/ESM	and	the	ESM	procedures	have	naturally	been	evolving	in	the	course	
of	the	crisis.	Currently,	the	ESM	is	substantively	involved	in	programme	negotiations,	submits	
proposals	for	financial	assistance	and	disbursements,	executes	those	and	monitors	repayment	
capacity.	 	
																																								 																				
75	In	the	most	recent	programmes	also	the	ESM	participates.	
76	It	is	for	these	reasons	that	countries	enter	into	separate	agreements	with	the	IMF	and	the	euro	area	institutions.	
IMF Euro	Area
Program	negotiation	and	implementation IMF	Staff Commission	services	(in	l iasion	with	the	ECB)
Decission	to	assist IMF	Board ESM	Board	of	Governors	(aka	Eurogroup)
Lending IMF EFSF/EFSM/ESM
Sources:	Pisani-Ferri	et	al.	(2013)
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Appendix B: A summary of the euro area programmes 
Greece 
In	 late	 2009,	 after	 recognising	 they	 had	 manipulated	 their	 fiscal	 accounts,	 the	 Greek	
Government	 approached	 its	 euro	 area	 partners	 asking	 for	 help,	 who	 at	 first	 asked	 for	 a	
significant	 fiscal	adjustment.77	As	 this	 strategy	 failed	and	 the	situation	spin	out	of	 control,	 in	
March	2010,	euro	area	governments	agreed	 to	provide,	 together	with	 the	 IMF,	a	110	billion	
EUR	financial	assistance	package,	composed	of	an	IMF	credit	and	bilateral	loans	by	euro	area	
members	(Greek	Loan	Facility,	GLF).	The	GLF	contributed	with	80	billion	euro,	with	a	maturity	
of	5	years	and	a	3-year	grace	period.	Its	pricing,	similar	to	IMF	practice,	was	organized	in	steps.	
From	 its	 side,	 the	 IMF	 contributed	 with	 a	 30	 billion	 euro	 Stand-by-Agreement	 with	 3-years	
duration,	a	maturity	of	 five	years,	 the	standard	200	bps	 for	credit	above	300%	of	 the	quota,	
and	additional	100	bps	for	credit	outstanding	after	3	years.	
By	mid-2011,	 despite	 that	 the	 first	 programme	 reviews	 spoke	 of	 “an	 impressive	 start”,	 the	
situation	 took	a	 turn	 for	 the	worst.	 The	 reasons	 for	 the	 set-back	were	excessively	optimistic	
projections,	initial	official	indecision,	weak	programme	implementation	and	the	excessive	cost	
of	initial	funding	conditions.	The	reaction	of	the	authorities	was	to	provide	additional	support	
by	 modifying	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 GLF.	 	 Despite	 these	 additional	 measures,	 by	 early	 2012,	 it	
became	clear	that	Greece	would	not	make	it	without	a	contribution	from	its	shrinking	private-
sector	 creditor	 base.	 In	 March	 2012,	 Greece	 signed	 a	 second	 programme	 with	 the	 official	
lenders.78	The	new	programme,	signed	with	the	EFSF	and	the	IMF,	envisioned	130	billion	euros	
of	additional	funding.	From	the	130	billion	euros,	25	billion	came	from	a	new	4-year	IMF	EFF	
program,	and	the	rest	(EUR	104	billion)	was	provided	by	the	EFSF,	with	a	20	year	maturity	and	
150	 bps	margin.	 The	 terms,	 of	 the	 EFSF	 and	 GLF	 loans	 were	 further	 softened	 in	 December	
2012.	
While	for	a	brief	period	this	second	program	appeared	to	be	working.	The	situation	in	Greece	
improved,	and	there	expectations	of	the	country	regaining	market	access.	Political	turmoil	(the	
country	underwent	even	a	referendum	on	the	euro	membership),	however,	led	to	the	second	
program	also	going	off-track.	In	the	final	step	thus	far,	in	September	2015,	Greece	entered	into	
a	new	3-year	86	billion	euro	programme	with	the	ESM.	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
77	We	thank	Nikos	Ventouris	for	his	help	in	preparing	this	summary.	
78	The	new	programme	included	a	debt	restructuring	that	brought	100	billion	of	NPV	relief	(Gulatti	et	al.,	2013).	
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Ireland 
In	 Ireland,	 banks	 had	 fueled	 a	mortgage	 boom	 in	 the	 years	 prior	 to	 the	 global	 crisis.79	 As	 a	
result,	 the	price	 for	real	state	had	more	than	tripled	 in	a	decade.	When	the	bubble	burst,	 to	
prevent	a	 financial	 collapse,	 the	government	was	 forced	 to	provide	 its	 taxpayers’	 support	 to	
the	country’s	financial	institutions.		
In	December	2010,	overburdened	by	the	housing	bubble	burst	and	the	subsequent	bail	out	its	
banking	 system,	 Ireland	 became	 the	 first	 client	 of	 the	 EFSF	 and	 the	 EFSM.	 The	 Irish	
programme,	designed	to	re-establish	a	sound	economic	and	financial	situation	and	to	restore	
its	capacity	to	finance	itself	on	the	financial	markets,	provided	a	financing	package	of	85	billion	
euros,	 to	be	disbursed	between	2010	and	2013.	 It	 included	contributions	by	 the	EFSM	 (22.5	
billion)	and	EFSF	(17.7	billion),	and	bilateral	loans	from	UK,	Sweden	and	Denmark	(3.8,	0.6	and	
0.4	billion	respectively).80	The	maturity	of	the	loan	was	set	at	7.5	years	and	the	margin	at	250	
bps.	Additionally,	Ireland	signed	a	7	years	EFF	agreement	with	the	IMF	for	22.5	billion	euro.		
Despite	 the	 official	 support,	 by	 mid-2011,	 spreads	 had	 crept	 up	 to	 unsustainable	 levels.	
According	 to	Pisani-Ferry	et	al.	 (2013),	 the	bad	sovereign	bond-market	performance	was	 the	
result	 of	 the	 effect	 on	 public	 debt	 of	 excessively	 rapid	 deleveraging	 and	 the	 bail-out	 of	 the	
banks’	 junior	creditors.	 In	an	attempt	to	provide	further	support	 to	 Ireland,	 the	terms	of	 the	
financial	agreement	were	modified	in	July	2011.	In	addition	to	fully	eliminating	the	margin	for	
both	 EFSM	 and	 EFSF	 loans,	 the	 maturity	 of	 both	 loans	 was	 extended	 by	 seven	 years,	 to	 a	
maximum	of	15	years.	An	additional,	and	final,	change	in	the	financing	terms	occurred	in	April	
2013,	 when	 authorities	 decided	 that	 EFSF	 and	 EFSM	 loan	 maturities	 would	 be	 further	
extended	to	22	years.	
During	 its	 three-year	 assistance	 programme,	 Ireland	 improved	 its	 financial	 regulation,	 and	
major	banks	were	closed	down,	while	some	of	the	remaining	firms	received	a	capital	boost.	A	
bad	bank	was	set	up	to	deal	with	non-performing	 loans.	 In	addition,	 the	country	 reduced	 its	
fiscal	deficit	and	regained	the	competitiveness	it	lost	during	the	boom.	This	led	to	a	successful	
exit	from	the	EFSF	programme	in	December	2013.	
	
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
79	We	thank	Daragh	Clancy	and	Carmine	Gabriele	for	their	help	in	preparing	this	summary.	
80	The	programme	also	included	an	Irish	contribution	of	17.5	billion	euro.	
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Portugal 
Portugal’s	 economic	 growth	 was	 weak	 already	 before	 the	 crisis.81	 This	 lack	 of	 dynamism	
contributed	to	high	levels	of	debt,	both	public	and	private.	When	the	global	crisis	hit	Europe	in	
2010,	 the	 country	 had	 little	 fiscal	 space	 to	 support	 the	 economy	 or	 the	 banks,	 which	 also	
became	 the	 focus	 of	 investors,	 who	 were	 concerned	 that	 Portuguese	 banks	 were	 too	
dependent	 on	 a	 weak	 economy.	 Investors	 responded	 by	 demanding	 ever-higher	 returns	 on	
Portugal's	bonds.	
In	 April	 2011,	 Portugal	 requested	 support	 to	 re-establish	 a	 sound	 economic	 situation	 and	
restore	its	capacity	to	finance	itself	on	the	financial	markets.	In	this	case	the	financing	of	the	78	
billion	euro	programme	fell	on	equal	parts	on	the	EFSM,	EFSF	and	IMF.	While	the	maturity	was	
set	to	7.5	years,	as	in	Ireland,	the	margin	was	lower,	about	210	bps.82	In	turn,	Portugal	signed	a	
26	billion	euro	3-year	EFF	programme	with	the	IMF.		
By	 mid-2011,	 the	 programme	 was	 risking	 going	 off-track.	 According	 to	 Pisani-Ferry	 et	 al.	
(2013),	 the	 programme	 relied	 on	 the	 implementation	 of	 structural	 reforms	 which	 did	 not	
materialize.	In	reaction	to	these	negative	developments,	the	EFSF	and	the	EFSM	granted	to	the	
Portuguese	authorities	an	improvement	in	the	conditions	of	the	loans.	Thus,	on	July	2011,	the	
euro	 area	 governments	decided	 to	 fully	 eliminate	 the	margin	 for	both	EFSM	and	EFSF	 loans	
and	 to	 extend	 the	maturity	 of	 EFSM	and	 EFSF	 loans	 to	 a	maximum	of	 15	 years.	 In	 order	 to	
maintain	identical	conditions	in	Portugal	and	Ireland,	identical	to	what	was	done	with	the	Irish	
loan,	a	final	change	in	the	terms	of	the	EFSF	and	EFSM	programmes	occurred	in	April	2013.	On	
that	 date,	 authorities	 decided	 that	 EFSF	 and	 EFSM	 loan	 maturities	 would	 be	 extended	 by	
additional	7	and	half	years,	to	22	years.	
The	 funds	 received	 from	 the	 official	 sector	 were	 used	 by	 the	 authorities	 to	 finance	 budget	
deficits	and	recapitalize	 the	banks.	 In	accordance	with	 the	conditionality,	Portugal	embarked	
on	 policies	 to	 bring	 down	 budget	 deficits,	 resolve	 its	 banking	 problems	 and	 modernize	 its	
economy.	 The	 programme	helped	 the	 economy	 to	 recover,	 as	 it	 became	more	 competitive,	
exports	started	to	grow,	the	account	deficit	was	eliminated,	budget	deficits	were	significantly	
reduced,	 and	 growth	 resumed.	 	As	 a	 result,	 Portugal	 regained	market	 access	 and	exited	 the	
programme	in	June	2014.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
81	We	thank	Alexander	Molzahn	and	Ricardo	Santos	for	their	help	in	preparing	this	summary.	
82	This	lower	spread	likely	reflected	that	the	Greek	and	Irish	programmes	were	both	performing	below	expectations.	
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Spain 
On	June	2012,	Spain	requested	financial	assistance	under	the	terms	of	Financial	Assistance	for	
the	 Recapitalisation	 of	 Financial	 Institutions	 by	 the	 EFSF.83	 This	 came	 in	 response	 to	 the	
increasing	financial	stress	of	the	Spanish	economy,	materialized	in	the	accumulation	of	strong	
capital	outflows,	mostly	 from	non-resident	 sectors.	This	 translated	 into	a	 record	high	 spread	
against	the	10-year	Bund	since	the	implementation	of	the	Euro.	Increasing	the	resilience	of	the	
banking	 sector,	 in	 particular	 of	 the	 saving	 banks	 (“Cajas”)	 with	 heavy	 real	 estate-related	
portfolios,	 was	 essential	 to	 restore	 market	 confidence	 and	 stabilise	 the	 economy	 (Bank	 of	
Spain,	2017).	In	addition,	at	European	level,	one	of	the	main	objectives	of	the	programme	was	
to	break	the	contagion	to	other	Member	States.	
Initially,	it	was	envisaged	that	this	Financial	Assistance	was	to	be	provided	by	the	EFSF	until	the	
ESM	became	fully	operational.	Eventually,	the	ESM	became	operational	in	time	to	address	the	
assistance	 from	 the	 onset.	 The	 programme	 designed	 for	 Spain	was	 not	 oriented	 to	 tackle	 a	
balance	of	payments	problem,	but	a	structural	problem	on	the	banking	system.	Reflecting	the	
specific	 focus	 of	 the	 program,	 the	 attached	 conditionality	 contained	 in	 the	 MoU	 only	
addressed	financial	sector	issues,	but	also	required	Spain	to	fully	comply	with	its	commitments	
under	 the	 EDP	 and	 European	 Semester	 recommendations.	 Unlike	 standard	 economic	
adjustment	 programmes,	 this	 did	 not	 contain	 new	 specific	 conditions	 in	 fiscal	 policies	 and	
structural	reforms.	As	a	result,	 the	programme	design	and	 implementation	deviated	so	much	
from	 the	 IMF’s	 programme	 template	 that	 the	 Fund	 could	 not	 participate	 financially.	 In	 this	
way,	 Spain	 became	 the	 first	 euro	 area	 country	 to	 be	 treated	 by	 the	 euro	 area	 safety	 net	 in	
financial	 solitude.	 The	 main	 objective	 of	 the	 programme	 was	 to	 increase	 the	 long-term	
resilience	of	 the	banking	 sector,	by	 removing	doubts	about	asset	quality,	orderly	downsizing	
bank	exposures	to	the	real	estate	sector,	restoring	market-based	funding	,	and	enhancing	risk	
identification	and	crisis	management	mechanism	(EC,	2016).		
The	ESM	programme	granted	 the	authorities	 access	 to	up	 to	100	billion	euro,	 about	10%	of	
GDP.	 Eventually,	 only	 41.3	 EUR	 bill	 were	 actually	 disbursed	 in	 two	 tranches,	 the	 first	 in	
December	2012	and	the	second	in	February	2013.	Later,	Spain	made	a	repayment	of	0.3	EUR	
bill	related	to	the	unused	funds	in	2014,	which	according	to	the	terms	of	the	ESM	facility	must	
be	 returned	 to	 the	 ESM.	 The	 loan	had	 at	 its	 inception	 a	 12.5	 years	maturity.	 	 Following	 the	
pricing	guidelines	of	the	ESM,	Spain	is	charged	a	50	bps	margin.	By	June	2017,	Spain	has	made	
five	voluntary	early	repayments	of	7.3	EUR	bill,	almost	20%	of	the	borrowed	funds.		
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
83	We	thank	Saioa	Armendariz	and	Beatriz	Urquizu	for	their	help	in	preparing	this	summary.	
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Cyprus 
Cyprus	 joined	 the	 euro	 in	 2008,	 which	 allowed	 it	 borrow	 cheaply	 to	 support	 the	 economy,	
which	 had	 weakened	 following	 the	 global	 crisis.84	 The	 first	 signs	 of	 distress	 in	 the	 banking	
sector	appeared	 in	2010.	The	banks	had	grown	too	 rapidly.	The	 ratios	of	deposits	and	 liquid	
liabilities	to	GDP	were	the	highest	in	Europe.	The	Cypriot	regulatory	framework	contributed	to	
the	large	inflows	of	capital	into	the	country’s	banks	and	property	market.	85	
Markets	 started	 to	 take	a	negative	view.	By	mid-2011,	Cyprus	was	no	 longer	able	 to	borrow	
money	 from	 investors.	 Cyprus	 addressed	 a	 request	 for	 stability	 support	 to	 the	 ESM	and	 the	
IMF	on	June	2012.	The	economic	adjustment	programme	was	 intended	to	address	short	and	
medium-term	 financial,	 fiscal	 and	 structural	 challenges	 facing	 Cyprus.	 Following	 a	 severe	
downturn	 that	 reduced	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 lending	 portfolio,	 and	 faced	 with	 losses	 on	 the	
holdings	 of	Greek	 sovereign	 bonds,	 the	 banking	 system	 in	 Cyprus	went	 into	 severe	 distress.	
The	 key	programme	objectives	were	 to	 restore	 the	 soundness	of	 the	Cypriot	banking	 sector	
and	rebuild	market	confidence	by	restructuring	and	downsizing	financial	institutions.	
In	Cyprus,	 the	 template	 replicated	earlier	EFSF	programmes,	 and	both	 the	ESM	and	 the	 IMF	
contributed	to	the	programme.	The	ESM	contributed	with	EUR	9	bill	and	the	IMF	with	1	EUR	1	
bill	 respectively.	 The	 IMF	 provided	 support	 under	 a	 7-year	 EFF	 agreement	 with	 the	 usual	
pricing	 structure.	 In	 turn,	 the	 ESM	 loan	 to	 Cyprus	 had	 a	 15	 years	maturity,	 extending	 up	 to	
2030.	The	margin	charged	by	the	ESM	is	10	bps.	
Following	 the	 program	 conditionality,	 Cyprus	 restructured	 and	 recapitalized	 its	 banks,	
improved	 financial	 regulation	 and	 supervision,	 and	modernized	 its	 legal	 framework	 (to	 help	
deal	with	the	high	level	of	nonperforming	loans).	Additionally,	fiscal	deficits	shrunk,	mitigating	
sustainability	 concerns.	As	 a	 result,	 Cyprus	 gradually	 regained	market	 access,	 and	exited	 the	
programme	in	March	of	2016.	
	
	 	
																																								 																				
84	We	thank	Lorenzo	Ricci	for	his	help	in	preparing	this	summary.	
85	As	a	consequence,	the	banking	sector	grew	until	its	assets	reached	7.5	times	GDP	in	2010.	
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Appendix C: Other Figures 
Figure	C.1.	The	behaviour	of	the	Yield	Curve	and	changes	to	official	loans	in	2013	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Each	graph	corresponds	to	the	behaviour	of	the	yield	curve	after	specific	changes.	The	July	2011	changes	correspond	to	a	maturity	extension	and	an	interest	rate	reduction.	The	March	2013	changes	correspond	to	a	
maturity	extension.	
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Figure	C.2.	The	behaviour	of	bid-ask	spreads	and	changes	to	official	loans	in	2013	
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Appendix D: Addressing fundamental default r isk through cash-f low 
management 
Corsetti	Erce	and	Uy	(2017)	illustrates	the	idea	of	lending	into	the	‘cost	of	default’	adopting	a	
standard	 three-period	 model	 of	 default	 (see	 e.g.	 Arellano	 and	 Ramanarayanan	 (2012).	 We	
focus	 on	 an	 economy	 where	 the	 initial	 debt	 is	 high	 enough	 that	 the	 country	 would	 find	 it	
optimal	to	default	in	case	of	bad	realization	of	fundamentals	(e.g.,	an	economic	downturn)	in	
the	second	period.	Hence,	the	country	can	only	issue	default-risky	bonds,	at	a	premium.	
Suppose	 that	default	entails	a	 loss	as	high	as	5	percent	of	 its	output,	and,	 in	 the	absence	of	
official	support,	the	country	would	be	able	to	issue	debt	of	both	one	and	two	period	maturity.	
These	 liabilities	will	be	risky	 in	 the	sense	that	markets	anticipate	repayment	 in	period	2	only	
conditional	on	 the	realization	of	good	 fundamentals---the	country	will	default	 in	a	 recession.	
So	 markets	 know	 that	 they	 can	 borrow	 only	 against	 repayments	 in	 expansions.	 More	
specifically,	 how	much	 debt	 is	 sustainable	 is	 pinned	 down	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 country	 will	
service	its	debt	up	to	5	percent	of	output	in	an	expansion---beyond	that	level;	it	will	be	rational	
for	the	country	to	default	also	when	fundamentals	are	good.	
In	 such	 a	 situation,	 official	 lending	 can	 increase	 debt	 sustainability	 by	 ruling	 out	 default	
altogether	 as	 follows:	 an	 international	 institution	 design	 a	 programme	 that	 make	 the	
government	 at	 least	 indifferent	 between	 (a)	 not	 paying	 its	 official	 debt	 in	 period	 2	 and	
suffering	 a	 5	 percent	 contraction	 in	 output	 in	 the	 downturn,	 and	 (b)	 using	 an	 equivalent	
amount	 of	 resources	 to	 service	 its	 official	 debt	 and	 avoid	 default.	 We	 show	 that	 this	
programme	can	be	implemented	through	official	loans	of	two-period	maturity,	combined	with	
a	cap	on	borrowing,	and	raise	social	welfare	in	the	country	in	each	period.	
We	 stress	 two	 key	 elements	 in	 the	program.	 First,	 the	 terms	of	 the	official	 lending	must	 be	
sufficiently	attractive	relative	to	market	rates---we	show	that	the	official	interest	rate	must	be	
set	as	a	 function	of	 the	probability	of	default,	and	the	distance	between	the	costs	of	default	
under	good	and	bad	fundamentals.	We	should	note	here	that	the	official	rate	may	be	above	or	
below	 the	 cost	 of	 funding	 for	 the	 official	 lender.	 Second,	 as	 in	 Tirole	 (2015),	 official	 lending	
must	 be	 associated	 to	 a	 credible	 cap	 on	 the	 country	 borrowing	 from	 the	 market---since,	
conditional	 on	 receiving	 the	 bailout,	 the	 government	 has	 an	 incentive	 to	 issue	 more	 risky	
liabilities	 against	 the	 extra	 output	 in	 the	 good	 states	 of	 the	 world,	 which	 would	 imply	
insolvency	and	default	in	the	downturn.	
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Appendix E:  Dataset on the Official  Loans to euro area countries 
We	assembled	a	dataset	with	details	on	the	terms	of	the	official	loans	to	the	crisis	countries	in	
the	 euro	 area.	 For	 each	 loan,	 the	 dataset	 includes	 sizes,	 maturities	 and	 interest	 rates.	 We	
organize	 the	 information	 in	 two	 spread	 sheets.	 One	 includes	 evolution	 of	 the	 loans	 as	 they	
were	 disbursed	 (quantities,	 interest	 rates	 and	maturities).	 The	 second	 spreadsheet	 contains	
details	on	the	repayment	profiles	generated	by	the	official	loans.	
The	time	series	for	interest	rates	has	been	built	by	modifying	the	series	provided	through	the	
ESM	webpage	with	 the	 detailed	 information	 from	 the	 programmes.	 Adjustments	 to	 interest	
rates	were	done	as	detailed	in	the	main	text.	In	turn,	the	series	on	maturities	were	built	using	
detailed	programme	information.	We	built	the	time	series	on	outstanding	exposure	using	the	
information	 on	 individual	 tranche	 disbursement	 available	 from	 the	 European	 Stability	
Mechanism	 webpage.	 The	 data	 on	 repayment	 profile	 can	 be	 retrieved	 from	 the	 European	
Stability	Mechanism	webpage.		
We	make	our	dataset	on	the	official	 loans	provided	by	the	euro	area	 institutions	available	at	
the	 address:	 https://sites.google.com/site/giancarlocorsetti/	 and	 the	 website	 of	 ADEMU	
http://ademu-project.eu	
	
The	dataset	posted	 reports	 the	 repayment	profiles	 for	 ESM	and	EFSF	 loans	 as	of	 the	end	of	
2016.	
	
	
